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Casting a Net into
Turbulent Waters:
Indian Salmon Fishing Rights in
Canada and the United States
by Brian R. Campbell
Introduction
[Hlarmony between the rights of Indians on each
side of the 49th parallel should be what one would
expect if the common law on both sides of the bor-
der were applied to the same customs, traditions
and practices on both sides of the border.
Lambert I. (dissenting in R. v. Van der Peet. 1993).
Despite what one might expect, harmony is not synony-
mous with Native fishing. The United States and Canada
have checkered records of protecting Native communities
and their resource base. Oscillating governmental policies.
imperiled resources and bitter relations pervade the study of
this topic. Water and salmonoid resources are vital to many
First Nations3 They provide economic sustenance and are
central to cultural identity. This article reviews and com-
pares Native fishing rights in Canada and the United States
by focusing on Pacific salmon. A common theme in both
countries is the difficulty of incorporating the cultural rights
and values of indigenous groups into the law of the land."
In Canada, the protection of First Nations' rights in the
Constitution Act of 19823 and the evolving interpretation of
aboriginal rights provide a contrast to U.S. law.
This Article does not focus on the biological intricacies
of anadramous fisheries, rather it concentrates on the fish-
ing rights and ancillary rights of indigenous communities in
the western regions of North America. Part I reviews judicial
decisions and governmental action that influence Native
interests in natural resources; Part 11 summarizes the resolu-
tion of fishery and water resource conflicts; and Part IllI con-
I.D.. 1994 University of California. Hastings College of the Law; M.PA.
1990 University of Southern California. BS,. Civil Engineering. 1936
University of California. Davis. The author is a licensed avil engineer and
attorney, and presently works in Oakland. California for the East Bay
Municipal Utility District. He is a Tribal Council member of the Federated
Coast Miwok Indian Tribe.
An earlier version of this Article was delivered and published in the
materials for the Sovereignty Symposium 1994 proceedings, sponsored by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Indian Affairs
Commission.
I. R. v. Van der Peet (1993). 83 CC.C. (3d) 289. 315 (B.C.CA.). 119931
C.N.LR. 221. 119931 5 W.WRoP. 459. 80 B.CLR. (2d) 75. 20 W.C.B. (2d) 305
(Lambert. I.. dissenting) Ileave to appeal to S.C.C. granted (1994). 86 C.CC.
(3d) vii, 170 N.R. 382ni.
2. First Nations include the Indian. Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada
according to § 35(2) of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1932. CMi. Coz:t
(Constitution Act. 1932) § 35(2). Throughout this Article indigenous persons
are referred to alternatively as Natives. First Nations. Native Americans,
Indians and tribes. The term Native Americans is used herein to identify
indigenous persons of the United States while the term First Nations is used
to refer to indigenous persons in Canada. and also more generally to refer
to all Indigenous persons of North America.
3. 'The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
^ Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed: CM a. Co:zs (Constitution
ct. 1982) § 35(i).
4. Royal Proclamation of October 7. 1763. R.S.C.. reprinted in
Volume 3, Num 1
trasts the preservation and enforcement of fishing
rights in each country, summarizes substantive dif-
ferences, and forecasts further developments for
coming years.
I. LEGAL RELATIONS
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and
essential to our Interest, and the Security of
our Colonies, that the several Nations or
Tribes of Indians with whom We are con-
nected, and who live under our protection,
should not be molested or disturbed in the
Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions
and Territories as, not having been ceded to
or purchased by Us, are reserved to them,
or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds. 4
Most people would agree that Native civiliza-
tions occupied and utilized most of, if not all, the
lands and waters of North America prior to
European contact. However, much disagreement
surrounds the characterization and interpretation of
aboriginal rights. The ultimate authority of Great
Britain was never questioned by early lurists, but
failing to do so left a gap in legal relations. The
Royal Proclamation exemplifies this as it asserts
ultimate authority, "Our Dominions and Territories",
then proceeds to confirm aboriginal interests,
"I lands not cededI are reserved to them." A neutral
reading does not explain how British powers and
aboriginal authority in the "reserved" areas are to be
distinguished or integrated. This tension between
national sovereignty and Native sovereignty is a
continuing theme from the earliest benchmark
cases of Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh5 and St.
Cathenne's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen6 to current
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA,
1759-1791 1985, App. ii. No. i. (The Royal Proclamation is more
relevant to Canada than it is to the United States, where ties to
Great Britain were repudiated in 1776.)
5. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823).
6. St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. R. (1888), 14 App.
Cas. 46 (P.C.).
7. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823). The plaintiffs Joshua Johnson and Thomas
Graham. the son and grandson of Thomas Johnson, Jr., respec-
tively, were bequeathed and took possession of two tracts of land
in Illinois that were purportedly purchased by Johnson and sev-
eral other men in a large land transaction with Piankeshaw
Indians on October 18. 1775. William M'Intosh was granted the
same land by United States patents on July 20. 1818 afterthe U.S.
entered into a treaty with the Piankeshaws. The Court ruled in
favor of M'Intosh holding that Indians could only alienate their
interests in the land to the government and not to individuals. Id.
at 587-90.
8. It has never been doubted that either the United States,
cases where the extent of aboriginal rights and sov-
ereignty are still at issue.
A. The United States
Fishing rights are lust one aspect of legal rela-
tions between Native Americans and the federal
government. Legal study in this area draws upon
treaties, federal legislation, governmental policies
and cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which encompasses
the western states) and the federal district courts.
All of these areas must be addressed to thoroughly
discuss the breadth of fishing rights. This section
begins by reviewing early case law regarding the sta-
tus of Native Americans.and their resources, then
discusses relevant statutes and policies before
turning to fishing rights.
1. The Marshall Trilogy
In 1823 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson
& Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh7 where Native interests
in land were characterized as rights of occupancy
sublect to extinguishment by valid exercise of leg-
islative authority.8 No attempt was made to recon-
cile contrasting systems of land use and ownership.
Instead, Chief Justice John Marshall asserted that
Great Britain, by virtue of being the first European
sovereign to "discover" lands that would later
become the United States, was entitled to underly-
ing title, which later passed to the United States.9
He did not state what rights were derived from the
actual discovery of the land by Native Americans
other than to hold that "the rights of the original
inhabitants were necessarily impaired" and "rights to
complete sovereignty were necessarily diminished
after European discovery."10
In 1831 and 1832, Marshall backed away from
or the several states, had a clear title to all the lands within the
boundary lines described in the treaty [concluding war with Great
Britaml. subiect only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that
the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested In that
government which might constitutionally exercise It, Id. at
584-85.
9. "While the different nations of Europe respected the right
of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion
to be in themselves: and claimed and exercised, as a conse-
quence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while
yet in possession of the natives.' Id. at 574.
10. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). Throughout the opinion
Marshall repeatedly asserted that the Crown had ultimate title
and sovereignty over all Indian lands, but the only legal justifica-
tion offered to explain why native rights were necessarily dimin-
ished is an abstract theory of conquest that was not applied to
the facts of the case. Arguably Marshall didn't have to reach such
an expansive holding and could have limited his review to the
treaty between the United States and the Piankeshaws, the con-
tested land transfer documents, and perhaps the Royal
Proclamation which, in 1775, prohibited British subjects from
purchasing Indian land.
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the sweeping statements of M'lntosh and expanded
upon the legal relations between Native Americans
and the government. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the
first Supreme Court case where an Indian Nation
was a party Marshall described the Cherokee
Nation as a domestic dependent nation. Further, he
characterized Native Americans as being in a state
of pupilage, their relation to the United States
"resembling that of a ward to his guardian."I The
next year Marshall authored his third opinion.
Worcester v. Georgia,12 and repudiated his M'lntosh con-
cept of discovery and conquest:
It is difficult to comprehend the proposi-
tion, that the inhabitants of either quarter
of the globe could have rightful original
claims of dominion over the inhabitants of
the other, or over the lands they occupied;
or that discovery of either by the other
should give the discoverer rights in the
country discovered which annulled the pre-
existing rights of its ancient possessors.
3
The Court invalidated Georgia's statute as it per-
tamed to Cherokee lands and recognized the
Cherokee's sovereignty: "[tlo construe the Itreatyl
expression 'managing all their affairs' into a surren-
der of self-government, would be, we think, a per-
version of their necessary meaning."i 4 The princi-
ples of M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation and Worcester, along
with relevant treaty language, form the foundation
of legal relations between Native Americans and the
federal government in the United States.
2. Governmental Statutes and Policies
The apparent victory of the Cherokee Nation in
Worcester was short lived as implementation of the
Indian Relocation Act of 183015 and the executive
policies of President Andrew lackson resulted in the
forcible removal of Cherokees from their ancestral
homelands to lands west of the Mississippi River,
which was envisioned as permanent Indian Country.
A candid summary of the removal policy and result-
ing loss of life and hardship can be found in United
States v. State of Midiigan.16 Conflicting governmental
signals pervade the study of United States law
regarding Native Americans. By 1850 settlement
pushed west of the Mississippi and Indian "policy"
was revamped.
The United States negotiated many treaties
during this era. The primary purposes of the treaties
were to extinguish Indian claims, establish peace-
able relations and to allow for settlement.
Secondarily, the United States desired to convert
Indians from a nomadic, hunter-gatherer society to
a civilized" agrarian culture reflecting Western
European values:
The reservation was a part of a very much
larger tract which the Indians had the right
to occupy and use. and which was adequate
for the habits and wants of a nomadic and
uncivilized people. It was the policy of the
government, it was the desire of the
Indians, to change those habits and to
become a pastoral and civilized people.7
I1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1. 17 (1831).
The Cherokee Nation sought the original junsdiction of the
Supreme Court as a foreign nation within the meaning of the
United States Constitution. The Court held that they were not a
foreign nation nor an independent state and jurisdiction was
denied.
12. Worcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Reverend Samuel A. Worcester of Vermont was carrying out mis-
sionary duties on the Cherokee Nation (reservation) when he was
apprehended by Georgia officials for violating a Georgia licensing
act. His Georgia conviction was set aside after the Supreme Court
found the Georgia statute null and void with respect to Cherokee
lands.
13. Id. at 542-43. Notwithstanding that "discovery" was
repudiated, United States and Canadian cases subsequently
cited M'intosh as authority for ultimate sovereignty over Indian
lands, and conveniently avoided the implications of Worcester. See
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States where lustice Reed dted
M'intosh for the proposition that "lalfter conquest lindiansl were
permitted to occupy portions of territory.... IThisl position of the
Indian has long been rationalized by the legal theory that discov-
ery and conquest gave the conquerors sovereignty over and owner-
ship of the lands thus obtained.' 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1954)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also Calder v. Attorney
General of British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 151
(S.C.C.), where Justice ludson in a plurality opinion cited M'Inlos
and Worcester as authority for extinguishment by legislation acts
passed without reserving First Nations nghts.
14. Wozrusttr. 31 US. (6 Pet.) at 553-54.
15. An Act to provide for the exchange of lands with the
Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for their
removal west of the Mississippi." Removal Act of May 28. 1830.
Ch. 148, 4 Star. 411 (codified as amended at 25 US.C. 174 (193811.
16, United States v. Michigan. 471 E Supp. 192.206-l I (W1.D.
Mich. 1979). The summary was based largely on S.'.,.x. Euar
MoR . THE OxmRD H=.-crOF THE AECM PoLE 445-52
(1965). The case was centered on the interpretation of aboriginal
fishing rights of Ojibiways and Chippewas in certain waters of the
Great Lakes.
17. Winters v. United States. 207 U.S. 564. 576 (1903)
(describing the Fort Bellankamp Reservation in Montana). The
same approach is also reflected in United States v. Washington:
It was the intention of the United States Government, in
negotiating treaties with the Indians. to make at least
non-coastal tribes agriculturlsts., although not to restrict
them to that. to diversify Indian economy, to teach west-
em skills and trades to the Indians and to accomplish a
transition of the Indians into western culture.
384 E Supp. 312. 355 (W.D. Wash, 1974). The derogatory language
of the court (and the desire to terminate or "transition" Native
cultures) reflects the imperialistic ethic that guided governmen-
tal polIcy during the 19th and much of the 20th century.
(W-Frig 0 Hat PDEAtkt&d-sFai11995
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The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that
the government had impliedly reserved enough
water to irrigate the reservation when it was estab-
lished; this process of implying tribal water rights
from the circumstances surrounding a treaty is com-
monly referred to as the Winters Doctrine.'
8
Congress abandoned the treaty making approach in
1871,19 but quasi-treaties continued under statuto-
ry enactment.
Treaties and statutes extinguished the vast
majority of aboriginal title in the lower 48 states.
The most detrimental piece of 19th century legisla-
tion affecting Native resources was the Dawes
General Allotment Act of 1887 20 The Act was osten-
sibly aimed at assimilation but ultimately decimat-
ed the Native resource base and impaired Native
sovereignty. The Act divided communal land hold-
ings into individual 160-acre allotments and con-
templated the ultimate dissolution of the Indian
tribe and its reservation. Lands remaining after
allotment were declared "surplus," subject to public
land disposal. Approximately ninety million acres
or sixty-seven percent of the Native land base was
lost as a direct result of the Dawes Act. Loss of
riparian land, loss of farming land, and loss of com-
plete jurisdiction and control over lands within
reservation boundaries, can all be attributed to the
Dawes Act. The Dawes Act was repealed by the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 21 but the dam-
ages suffered were not redressed. In turn, the
Reorganization Act process was reversed by the ter-
mination process, which eliminated the special sta-
tus of particular Indian tribes in the name of equal
rights and total assimilation. 22 During this era (1940
-1962) 109 tribes and bands embracing 11,466 trib-
al members were terminated, and over 1,362,155
acres of land were affected.23 The termination
process too was overturned by subsequent
Congressional action.
This sampling of governmental policies and
statutes when measured against the decisions of
Cherokee Nation and Worcester illustrates the difficulty
of making generalizations about "Indian law." The
guardian-ward relationship identified in Cherokee
Nation cannot be reconciled with the tumultuous
nature of governmental action that followed. The
unsettling conclusion is that collectively the execu-
tive policies, legislative actions and decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court regarding Native Americans do
not form a cohesive or consistent doctrine.
Consequently, decisions regarding fishing rights
and water resource conflicts are highly contextual.
3. Settlement of the West and Preservation of Fishing Rights
Pacific salmon range from the central coast of
California in the south to the Bering Sea of Alaska
in the north. The discussion herein focuses on the
Pacific coast states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon
and California. This is not to ignore the fact that
Idaho and parts of Montana, Nevada and Wyoming
also drain to the west coast, but the limited scope
of this Article requires limited geographic coverage
and arguably the coastal states have played a more
substantial role in salmon fishery law than interior
states.
The United States gained control of the area
within present day Oregon and Washington by set-
tling conflicting claims with Spain, Russia and Great
Britain via treaties2 4 The Oregon Territory was
established pursuant to the Act of 1848 which "pre-
served rights to person or property now pertaining
to the Indians."25 The Act also extended to the
Oregon Territory the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
which required that "good faith shall always be
18. Most reserved rights are based on agriculture: conse-
quently. the amount of reserved water is quantified by a "practi-
cably irngable acreage" (PIA) standard. Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 600 (1963). Where agriculture cannot be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances, reserved water rights are more
tenuous, but nevertheless may be substantial. Id. at 600; see also
mnfra note 108.
19. Act of March 3, 1871. 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§71 (1994)).
20. General Allotment Act of 1887. 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34. 339. 341. 348-49, 354. 381
(1994)).
21. indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1994)).
22. The Termination Process is exemplified by House of
Representatives Concurrent Resolution 108. August 1, 1953:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possi-
ble to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the
United States subject to the same laws and entitled to
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applica-
ble to other citizens of the United States, and to grant
them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining to
American citizenship.... lilt is declared to be the sense
of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the
Indian tribes and the individual members thereof locat-
ed within the States of California. Florida, New York,
Texas, and all of the following named Indian tribes and
individual members thereof, should be freed from
Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities
and limitations specially applicable to Indians_...
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953)
23. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW; CASES AND
MATERIALS 158 (3d ed.. 1991).
24. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb, 22, 1819,
U.S.-Spain, 8 Stat. 252; United States-Russia Convention of April
17, 1824, 8 Stat. 302; Oregon Treaty, June 15, 1846, U.S.-Gr Brit., 9
Stat. 869.
25. Act of August 14. 1848, ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323.
Voume 3, Nudw IBnan R. WMe
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observed towards the Indians; their lands and prop-
erty shall never be taken from them without their
consent.2 6 Subsequent conflicts between settlers
and Native Americans led to the enactment of the
Indian Treaty Act.
2 7
Joel Palmer, a respected settler, made treaties
with several Oregon tribes along the Columbia
River, relocating them to the Umatilla and Warm
Spnngs Indian Reservations. 28 In 1853, Washington
became a separate territory and Indian relations
were specifically kept within the purview of the
United States. 9 Isaac Stevens was appointed gover-
nor and, in a few months, he entered into fourteen
treaties.3b Fishing rights were an integral part of the
treaty making process and settlement was predicat-
ed on satisfactorily preserving fishing rights. Several
Oregon and Washington treaties contain substan-
tially identical provisions "securing to the tribes
'the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places in common with citizens of the Territory.'"3' A
significantly more important provision is in the
1859 Treaty with the Yakima 32 Indians:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the
streams where running through or border-
ing said reservation is further secured to
said confederated tribes and bands of
Indians, as also the right of taking fish at all
usual and accustomed places, in common
with citizens of the territory, and of erecting
temporary buildings for curing them;
together with the privilege of hunting,
gathenng roots and berries, and pasturing
their horses and cattle upon open and
unclaimed land.
33
Conflicts over Native fishing have required the
judiciary to repeatedly interpret this treaty lan-
guage.
3'
To the south in California. quite a different legal
context emerged. In 1848. the United States
acquired California and other southwestern states
from Mexico through the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.35 The Treaty respected existing land grants
made under Mexican or Spanish authority, but did
not explicitly protect the rights of Indians residing
in California.36 Subsequently, Congress passed leg-
islation giving repose to California titles but offer-
ing only limited protection to Indians.37 Claims not
presented to the California Land Commission with-
in two years of this Acts enactment constituted
abandonment of any rights to title.3,3 The Supreme
Court held that the Act created a mechanism which
extinguished aboriginal title. The Court admitted
that the Indians were wards of the Mexican govern-
ment and by cession became wards of the United
States. The obligation to deal with wards, however,
was held to be the responsibility of the other l5olit-
26. Northwest Ordinance of 1787. art. III, I Stat. 51. 52.
27. Act of June 5, 1850. ch. 16.9 Stat 437.
28. FAY G. COHEN. TRFA-lEs ON TRIAL- THE CONTINUING
CONTROVERSY OvER NORTHwEsT INDIAN FISHING RIGHTs 36 (1986).
29. "iNlothing in said act shall affect the authority of the
United States to make any regulations respecting the Indians of
said Territory. their lands, property, or other nghts, by treaty, law.
or otherwise.' Act of March 2. 1853. 10 Stat. 172. 173.
30. Fay G. Cohen provides background information on the
treaty process in chapter 3 of his book. See COHEN, supra note 28.
A complete list of the treaties appears in United States v.
Washington. 384 F. Supp. 312, 349 (W.D. Wash. 1974). For a his-
toncal account of events leading up to the treaties, see Kent D.
Richards. Histonical Antecedents to tie Boldt Decision. 4 W. LEGAL Hist.
69 (1991).
31. Sohappy v. Smith. 302 F. Supp. 899. 904 (D. Or. 1969).
32. In 1994 Congress 'redesignated" the Yakima Indian
Nation to the Yakama Indian Nation. Pub. L No. 103-434. §
1204(g), 108 Stat 4526 (1994). Nevertheless, for the purposes of
this Article. 'Yakima" will be used throughout.
33. 12 Stat 951. art III (1959), cited In United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371. 378 (1905).
34. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n. 443 U.S. 658.661-69 (1979) provides a good
overview of iudiaal involvement with Native American salmon
fishing in the Northwest
35. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2. 1848, U.S.-Mex.. 9
Stat. 922.
36. For example, the Treaty provided that.
In the said territories, property of every kind. now
belonging to Mexicans not established there, shall be
Inviolably respected. The present wners, the heirs of
these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said
property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it. guar-
anties Isicl equally ample as if the same belonged to cit-
izens of the United States
Id. art. Viii.
37. The Act of March 3. 1851 provided:
lilt shall be the duty of the commissioners herein pro-
vided for to ascertain and report to the Secretary of the
Interior the tenum by which the mission lands are held.
and those held by civilized Indians. and those who are
engaged In agriculture or labor of anrl kind. and also
those which are occupied and cultivated by Pueblos or
Rancheros Indians.
Act of March 3. 1851, ch. 41.§ 16.9Stat. 631. 634.
38. Section 13 of the Act providedc
That all lands, the claims to which have been finally
relected by the commissioners in the manner herein
provided, or which shall be finally decided to be invalid
by the District or Supreme Court. and all lands the
claims to which shall not have been presented to the
said commissioners within two years after the date of
this act, shall be deemed, held. and considered as part
of the public domain of the United States....
Id. §13.
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ical branches, not the judiciary.39 The provisions of
the Treaty Act and the Northwest Ordinance are not
applicable to California. To provide for California
Indians, executive orders established a few large
reservations and preserved rancherias created
under Mexican land use patterns. Fishing rights
were not explicitly provided for, but under the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior,40 regula-
tions for food fishing and commercial fishing were
promulgated. The case law presented in the next
section examines the ramifications of not having
explicit treaty fishing rights.
To the north, in Alaska, still a different situation
unfolded. Aboriginal claims were basically ignored
for one hundred years after the United States
acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867 In a significant
aboriginal rights case, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the extinguish-
ment of aboriginal rights did not give rise to a claim
for compensation. 41 Reconciling that case with the
guardian-ward relation (trust responsibility) is
impossible. The mechanism used to expressly
extinguish aboriginal title and provide compensa-
tion was the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) of 1971.42 The act set aside over forty mil-
lion acres of land, established a fund of
$462,500,000 to be disbursed through native corpo-
rations and provided a two-percent mineral royalty.
The land entitlements were subject to a twenty year
exemption from taxation. In 1987, ANCSA was
amended to extend restrictions on alienation and
provide protection from forfeiture or attachment.43
Although subsistence hunting and fishing rights
were secured for Native Alaskans, jurisdictional
questions remain over the extent of Native regula-
tory authority.44
The foregoing review of federal-state-native
relations explains why the case law of Washington
and Oregon cannot automatically be applied to
California or Alaska. The pending analysis of fishing
rights requires a contextual approach. Pertinent
treaty language, relevant legislation, regulations
and state enactments must be considered to delin-
eate the breadth of fishing rights.
B. Canada
In Canada, legal relations between First
Nations and the government are just as strained as
those south of the border. In many areas, including
the Atlantic provinces, most of British Columbia
and the Yukon Territory, First Nations interests were
virtually ignored, leaving vast tracts of territory sub-
ject to aboriginal claims. ironically, the Pacific
salmon runs of Canada occur primarily in areas
without treaties. Therefore, in addition to under-
standing treaty r4ghts, the evolving doctrines of
aboriginal rights and settlement agreements must
be addressed to summarize salmon fishing rights,
Another distinguishing characteristic of Canadian
law is section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act of 1982
which raises First Nations' rights to a constitutional
level.
1. Governmental Policies
The Royal Proclamation of 176345 centralized
the legal relations of Native groups with Great
Britain. It was written after the conclusion of the war
between France and England where First Nations
fought on both sides. The portion of the document
relevant to indigenous groups served as a peace
and friendship treaty and established uniform rules
to govern Indian lands throughout the British
Territories in North America. 46 The main terms of
the document have never been repealed in Canada
and rights derived from the Proclamation are specif-
ically recognized in the Constitution Act of 1982. 47
39. Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 492 (1901). The Court
interpreted 4 16 of the Land Commission Act as "discharging" the
obligation of the government to deal with its wards. Id.
40. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (1994).
41. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272
(1954). See supra note 13.
42. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1994)). Section
1603(b) states:
IAIII aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal
title in Alaska based on use and occupancy, including
submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland
and offshore, and including any aboriginal hunting or
fishing nghts that may exist, are hereby extinguished.
43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994).
43. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (1988) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
44. See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management &
Planning, 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988). "Congress has demonstrated
its intent that Alaska Native Communities not be accorded sov-
ereign tribal status." Id. at 41.
45. See supra text accompanying note 4.
46. Brian Slattery. The Hidden Constitution: Abonginal Rights In
Canada, in THE OUEST FOR JUSICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND ABORIGINAL
RIGMTS 114 (Menno Boldt et al. eds., 1985),
47. Part I of the 1982 Constitution consists of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms which states:
The guarantees in this Charter of certain rights and free-
doms shall not be construed as to abrogate or derogate
from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights and freedoms
that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada Includ-
ing: (a) any nghts or freedoms that have been recognized by the
Royal Prodamation of October 7, 1763
CAN. CoNsr. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1. § 25, (emphasis added).
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The principle provisions (1) prevent Britain from
granting non-ceded Indian lands. (2) prevent British
subjects from buying or settling on Indian lands,
and (3) reserve non-ceded lands to the Indians until
purchased by the Dominion. Most commentators
agree that the Proclamation affirmed aboriginal
rights, but split ranks when describing the nature
and scope of those rights.
Approximately 500 treaties have been negotiat-
ed between the Crown and various First Nations in
Canada.4 The treaties can generally be broken
down into three categories: peace and friendship
treaties made prior to confederation, the Vancouver
Island treaties and the numbered Robinson treaties
covering much of the Prairie provinces. Fishing and
hunting rights on unoccupied Crown land were usu-
ally reserved to First Nations.4 9 Within British
Columbia, the only areas sublect to 19th century
treaties are at the southern end of Vancouver Island,
covered by the Douglas Treaties. and the northeast
comer of the province, covered by Robinson Treaty
No. 8. The fourteen Douglas treaties, negotiated
between 1850 and 1854, occur within salmon habi-
tat. These treaties only cover 1/40th of the Island's
land mass, and curiously they were modeled on the
New Zealand treaty of Waitanangi (1840) instead of
the eastern Canadian treaties. The treaty language
affirmed that Saanich Indians were "at liberty to
hunt over the unoccupied lands, and to carry on our
ftshenes as formerly."50 Hinkson IA described the
unqualified fishing rights:
ITIhe right granted to the Indians by treaty
is unique in the sense it is difficult to
describe it within the framework of tradi-
tional legal terminology. While the right
does not amount to a proprietary interest
in the sea bed nor a contractual right to a
fishing ground, it does protect the Indians
against infringement of their rights to carry
on the fishery, as they have done for cen-
turies. in the shelter of Saanichton
Bay... .The right granted by the treaty is
broader than the words of the treaty may
on their face indicate. The right to carry on
the fishery encompasses other rights which
are incidental to the right granted by the
treaty5i
The implications of this language are examined fur-
ther in Part 11.
The rest of Vancouver Island and mainland
British Columbia did not follow the treaty pattern.
One explanation attributes this to "the reluctance of
both the imperial treasury and the Vancouver Island
assembly to pay bills."' 2 Instead of treaties being
negotiated, reserve lands were unilaterally set aside
which usually included village sites, fishing sta-
tions, burial grounds, cultivated lands and other
lands of special interest.53 Some uncertainty exists
over the extent of resource rights attaching to
reserve lands. However. Burrard PowerCo. v. The King'4
supports the reservation of water rights (and pre-
sumably fishing rights), even in the absence of
express reference, when necessary in order to fulfill
the objects and intent with which lands were con-
veyed or appropriated. 5'
After Governor Douglas retired in 1864, this
conciliatory policy changed dramatically. Foster
characterizes the policy for the next 125 years as fol-
lows:
(a) No treaties had to be made because
there is no such thing as Indian title: (b) if
there is such a thing as Indian title, B.C.'s
Indians never had it; (c) if they did have it,
it was implicitly extinguished by colonial
legislation prior to 1871 and by native
acquiescence in incompatible land use
since that time: and (d) if it was not extin-
guished and they are entitled to compen-
sation, Ottawa has to bear the cost.56
This policy led to the strong drive for constitutional
48. Patnck Macdem. First Nations Self-Govimment and the
Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination. 36 McGiu. LI. 382. 425
(1991).
49. As stated in R. v. Sikyea (1964). 43 D.LR. (2d) 150, 152
(N.V.T.CA). "Itlhe nght of Indians to hunt and fish for food on
unoccupied Crown lands has always been recognized In Canada.-
50. Saanichton Bay Manna v. Claxton (1989). 36 B.C.L., 79
at 81 (B.C.C.A.) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 90. Hinkson IA relied upon Simon v. R. (1985). 24
D.LR. (4th) 390 at 403 (S.C.C.). where Chief lustice Dickson stat-
ed that for the treaty right of hunting to be effective It must
.embody those activities reasonably incidental to the act of hunt-
ing itself, an example of which is traveling with the requisite
hunting equipment to the hunting grounds.
52. Hamar Foster. Tie Saan!dlton Bay Manna Cast Impenal La.
Conlal History and Competing TFone cjAfonginl TIlL, 23 U. B.C. L
REv. 629. 631 (1989).
53. Piciw.i BAR=, As rc IIT. Rimsa  Cs k . A
STuD'" oF AwOxGAL TiE m WATmR A:D lIt; WAEaR Ricrs 44
(1988).
54. Burrard Power Co. v.The King. 119141 App. Cas. 87 (P.C..
55. BAmnrr. supra note 53. at 37. The holding is analogous
to the Vinters Doctrine In the United States. however, a treaty
was not invqlved In the Burrard Pc-otr case. The differences
between treaty and non-treaty Indians are addressed further in
Parts I and Ill.
56. Foster, supra note 52. at 631.
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recognition of First Nations rights and explains why
aboriginal claims in British Columbia are now a
major concern. Existing reserves only cover a small
portion of the traditional territory of First Nations
and many conflicting claims remain to be resolved.
The situation in the Yukon Territory is similar. The
settlement process, however, is in an advanced
stage whereas the British Columbia process is in its
initial stage. The pertinent agreements are dis-
cussed later in this section under the heading
"Settlement Agreements."
2. Legislation
The Confederation Act of 1867 established the
framework for Canada to function as a nation. The
accompanying Constitution Act of 1867 enumerated
heads of legislative authority for provincial and fed-
eral government. The only reference to jurisdiction
over Native affairs is found in section 91(24). where
exclusive legislative authority is extended to "Indian
and Lands reserved for the Indians." Anadramous
fisheries are also an area of exclusive federal juris-
diction under section 91(12). Pursuant to this sec-
tion, the Fisheries Act and the first Salmon Fishery
Regulations for British Columbia were adopted. In
1917, the first comprehensive regulations restricted
First Nations to food fishing, and thereafter, "the
federal regulations became increasingly strict in
regard to the Indian fishery over time, as first the
commercial fishery developed and then sport fish-
ing became common."'
7
Provincial legislative authority pertains to
property, civil rights and local matters. In contrast
to the United States, natural resources in Canada
are generally subject to provincial or territorial gov-
ernmental control (excluding anadramous fish-
eries). To secure a land base in British Columbia,
First Nations were ironically dependent on the
province transferring title to the federal govern-
ment, thereby giving the provincial government a
strong hand in Native affairs. The practical effect of
that is not readily apparent because aboriginal title
was never surrendered in British Columbia. The
Indian Act of 1868,58 as amended, is very important
to treaty interpretation. Section 88 of the Act pro-
tects treaty, rights and incorp6rates by reference
provincial legislation of general applicability:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other
Act of Parliament of Canada, all laws of
general applicability from time to time in
force in any province are applicable to and
in respect of Indians in the province, except
to the extent that such laws are inconsis-
tent with this Act or any order, rule, regula-
tion or by-law made thereunder, and except
to the extent that such laws make provision
for any matter for which provision is made
by or under this Act (emphasis added).' 9
Several treaty hunting and fishing cases (as dis-
cussed in Part II, B) depend on the judicial interpre-
tation of section 88. Other important provisions of
the Indian Act appear in section 81(1) where sub-
section (o) authorizes Band Councils to make by-
laws for the preservation, protection and manage-
ment of fur bearing animals, fish and other game:
subsection (f) allows by-laws for the construction
and maintenance of water courses; and subsection
(g) authorizes the construction and regulation of
water supplies.
The farthest reaching legislation regarding First
Nations in Canada is the Constitution Act of 1982,
specifically sections 25 and 35. They are as follows:
The guarantees in this Charter of certain
rights and freedoms shall not be construed
as to abrogate or derogate from any abo-
riginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms
that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of
Canada including:
(a) any rights or freedoms that have
been recognized by the royal procla-
mation of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now
exist by way of land claims agreements
or may be so acquired. 60
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act 'aboriginal peoples of
Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and
Metis peoples of Canada,
(3) For greater certainty in subsection (1)
'treaty rights' includes rights that now exist
by way of land claims agreements or may
be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights
referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons. 61
57. lack v. R. (1979), I00 D.L.R. (3d) 193 at 205 (S.C.C.). This
case reviews the history of fishery regulation in British Columbia.
58. Indian Act, R.S.C., chs. I-5 (1985).
59. Id. § 88 (emphasis added).
60. CAN. CONST., 5ra note 47, § 25.
61. Id. § 35.
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The entrenchment of aboriginal rights in the
Constitution culminates a long struggle, but more
Supreme Court cases and negotiated agreements
are needed to assess the full impact of the legisla-
tion. Section 25 is written as a shield to the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, but it also affirmatively
protects rights secured under sub-sections (a) and
(b). Section 35 is more substantive because it is
written in stronger language and it is not within the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms which is subject to
the interpretive limits of section 1.62 The Supreme
Court's first venture into aboriginal rights under
section 35(1) came in R. v. Sparrow.63 The methodol-
ogy and the holding of the case are very important
to First Nations and will be presented in the context
of aboriginal rights/title.
3. Abornginal Title
Aboriginal title has not been precisely defined
and uncertainty abounds over the full extent of
rights which flow therefrom. Aboriginal concepts of
society, and especially those regarding property, are
so vastly different from European conceptions that
reconciliation is problematic, i.e., First Nations
never contemplated exclusive ownership of the
planet (Mother Earth) via a geometric grid system.
Integrating Native interests with Anglo-based prop-
erty law requires rethinking assumptions about
underlying title. After the enactment of section 35,
it is no longer appropriate to defer to government
where aboriginal interests have not been surren-
dered. As Slattery suggests, "it is not enough to
found the acquisition of the continent on some bit
of puffery in an ancient Charter."64 In its initial post
section 35 deliberations, the Supreme Court of
Canada has stressed the importance of describing
aboriginal rights as sui genens interests without com-
mon law equivalents. 6'
A full description of what falls under the
umbrella term of aboriginal rights is difficult
because Canadian courts have not reached that
juncture. However, one doctrinal summary reads:
From early colonial days. the doctrine of
aboriginal rights has formed part of the
basic constitutional structure of Canada. It
originated in principles of colonial law that
defined the relationship between the
62. Section 1 states that "Itlhe Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out In it
subiect only to such reasonable limits prescibed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Id. § 1.
63. R. v. Sparrow (1990). 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.
64. Brian Slattery. Understanding Abonginal Righits. 66 CAN. B.
REv. 727. 736 (1987).
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British Crown and the native peoples of
Canada and the status of their lands, laws,
and existing political structures. Some of
these principles were articulated in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763. and were
reflected in treaties concluded between the
Crown and particular native groups. At
Confederation, they passed into the feder-
al sphere, and formed a body of basic com-
mon law principles operating across
Canada. 6
Other scholars have focused on two competing the-
ories to define aboriginal rights: (1) the contingent
rights theory-abonginal rights are dependent on
recognition of them by the sovereign, and (2) the
inherent rights theory--aboriginal rights have an
independent origin and are only lost via express
extinguishment, abandonment or consent.67 Early
courts, deferential to the Crown, adopted the con-
tingent rights approach, whereas recent decisions
and the Constitution Act of 1982 lean toward the
inherent rights approach.
The Supreme Court's initial interpretation of
aboriginal rights came in St. Catherinds Milling &
Lumber Co. v. The Queents in 1888. As in Johnson &
Graham's Lese v. M'lntosh, a Native party was not
before the Court. The dispute centered on whether
the Dominion or Ontario held beneficial interest to
lands ceded by the Salteaux Tribe of Ojibbeway
Indians via the Treaty of October 3. 1873. After dis-
cussing the Royal Proclamation, the Privy Council
asserted:
ITIheir possession, such as it was, can only
be ascribed to the general provisions made
by the royal proclamation in favour of all
Indian tribes then living under the sover-
eignty and protection of the British
Crown.. .the tenure of the Indians was a
personal and usufructuary right, dependent
upon the good will of the Sovereign.. .The
Crown has all along had a present propri-
etary estate in the land. upon which the
Indian title was a mere burden. 9
Eighty-five years later in Calder v. Attorney General of
British Columbia, the existence of aboriginal title still
65. Guenrin v. R. (1984),13 D.LR. (4th) 321 at 339 (S.C.C.
66. Slattery. supra note 64. at 782.
67. Michael Asch & Patrick M.aclem. Afongma! Rights and
Canadian Szu-:rt;nly. An Essay on R. v. Sparrow. 29 ALeTA L Ra-v.
498(1991).
63.118881. 14 App. Cas. 46.(P.C).
69. Id. at 55. 58.
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vexed the Supreme Court. Six members of the Court
agreed in the abstract that aboriginal interests
could exist, but they split 3-3 on whether such inter-
ests had been validly extinguished. 70 One other jus-
tice decided the case on procedural grounds (Crown
immunity) which effectively denied the Nishga
Nation legal redress to establish rights over territo-
ry they have occupied since time immemorial.
Then, in 1984, the Supreme Court expanded
upon the meaning of aboriginal title in Guerin v. The
Queen, with Dickson J. writing "Indian title is an inde-
pendent legal right which, although recognized by
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, none the less pre-
dates it."7i The nature of title was described:
Indians have a legal right to occupy and
possess certain lands, the ultimate title to
which is in the Crown. While their interest
does not, strictly speaking, amount to ben-
eficial ownership, neither is its nature com-
pletely exhausted by the concept of a per-
sonal right. It is true the sut genens interest
which the Indians have in the land is per-
sonal in the sense that it cannot be trans-
ferred to a grantee, but it is also true, as
will presently appear, that the interest
gives rise upon surrender to a distinctive
fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown
to deal with the land for the benefit of the
surrendering Indians. 72
Although Guenn was decided after 1982, section 35
was not implicated because the facts of the case
arose prior to its enactment. The pre-1982 case law,
which generally did not further aboriginal interests,
was one of the motivations for constitutional
reform. Unfortunately, constitutional recognition of
aboriginal rights in section 35 does not make it eas-
ier to describe those rights.
70. Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1973). 34
D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.). justice Judson refused to question that
the Nishga Territory became part of British Columbia without
elaborating on how the Nishga territory was acquired. Id. at 155.
He disagreed that the Royal Proclamation could serve as a basis
for Indian title, but acknowledged that 'when the settlers came.
the Indians were there organized in soceties and occupying the
land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what
Indian title means and it does not help one in the solution of this
problem to call it a 'personal or usufructuary nght.'" Id. at 156
(quoting St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber v. R. (1888), 14 App.
as. 46 at 54 (P.C.)), Despite this, justice Judson held that 'the
sovereign authority elected to exercise complete dominion over
the lands in question, adverse to any right of occupancy which
the Nishga INationi might have had " Id. at 167. 1tstice Hall
took a different approach and recognized at the outset that "Itlhe
Nishgas were never conquered nor did they at any time enter into
a treaty or deed of surrender as many other Indian tribes did... "
Id. at 168. Contrary to justice Judson, justice Hall believed "abo-
riginal Indian title does not depend on treaty, executive order or
4. The Sparrow Doctnne
The Queen v. Sparrow was the first Supreme Court
case that focused on aboriginal rights in the context
of section 35(1). The first step taken was to estab-
lish the existence of aboriginal right. In Sparrow, the
Court found that "Itihe evidence reveals that the
Musqueam have lived in the area as an organized
society long before the coming of European set-
tlers, and that the taking of salmon was an integral
part of their lives and remains so to this day."73
Although the Court had little trouble finding that
food fishing was an aboriginal right, it did not
devote much attention to the right of self regula-
tion. As supported by the appellant, Sparrow, and
the intervener, the National Indian Brotherhood
Assembly of First Nations, the right to regulate the
fishery and to exercise band discretion over the
resource is also an aboriginal right.74 The Court's
unwillingness to grapple with self-government can
be viewed as either an appropriate use of ludicial
discretion for an issue that borders on non-justicia-
bility or as an indication that the Court does not
want to bring about rapid change.
After finding that an aboriginal right was at
stake, Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest i. examined
whether government regulation of fisheries inter-
fered with the aboriginal right to food fish. They artic-
ulated a framework to interpret the "recognized and
affirmed" language of section 35(1). It is summarized
as follows: First, section 35(1) must be construed in a
purposive way, when the purposes or the affirmation
of aboriginal rights are considered, a generous, liber-
al interpretation of the words in the constitutional
provision is demanded. The trust-like duty imports
some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power.
The government is required to bear the burden of
justifying any legislation that has some negative
effect on any aboriginal right protected under section
35(l). A contextual case-by-case approach to section
legislative enactment." Id. at 200. Hall concluded: "I would, there-
fore, allow the appeal with costs throughout and declare that the
appellants' right to possession of the lands ... and their rights to
enjoy the fruits of the of the forest, and of the rivers and streams,
have not been extinguished." Id. at 223. justice Pigeon would not
have allowed the case in the absence of a fiat of the Lieutenant
Governor. Id. at 226.
71. Guerin v. R. (1984), 13 D.LR. (4th) 321 at 336 (S.c.C,).
72. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
73. R. v. Sparrow (1990), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 398 (Sc.C),
implicitly the Court adopted "integral part of their lives" as the
appropriate benchmark for finding an aboriginal right. In the con-
text of fishing it was relatively easy to find an aboriginal right and
the Court did not have to expend much time on the issue, but the
aboriginal right to regulate the fishery or control water quality Is
not as easy to analyze. Conceptually food fishing Is much easier
to deal with than rights of self government,
74. Id. at 404.
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35(1) is required. Second, legislation that affects the
exercise of aboriginal rights will be valid if it meets
the test for justifying an interference with a right rec-
ognized and affirmed under section 35(1). The court
will conduct a two-tier analysis to determine whether
a right has been interfered with and if such interfer-
ence is lustified. To analyze interference, these ques-
tions are posed: Does the legislation have the effect of
interfenng with a right? What are the characteristics
or incidents of the right? Is there pnma facie interfer-
ence? Is the limitation unreasonable? Does the regu-
lation impose undue hardship? Does the regulation
deny the nght holder their preferred means of exer-
cising that right? Dunng this part of the analysis, the
onus of proving a prima facie infringement lies on
the individual or group challenging the legislation.
If a prima facie infnngement is found, the analy-
sis proceeds to justification. The first justification
threshhold is to find a valid legislative and regulatory
oblective. Valid oblectives include preserving section
35(1) rights by conserving and managing a natural
resource, preventing harm to the general populace of
First Nations, and other compelling and substantial
oblectives. A public interest test is not required. The
final stage of this analysis considers the extent of
ifrinngement. Has there been as little infringement as
possible? In a situation of expropnation, is fair com-
pensation warranted? Was the abonginal group in
question consulted regarding the conservation mea-
sures? Dunng this part of the analysis, the onus of
proving justification is on the government 75
Despite the apparent breadth of the analysis,
Sparrow has been criticized. As stated earlier, fishing
rights are lust one aspect of governmental relations,
and recognizing fishing rights without acknowledg-
ing powers of self-government was viewed as a
defeat by many. One assessment characterizes the
decision as unfaithful to the broader vision of sec-
tion 35 asserted by Native organizations, namely,
achievement of self-government and an economic
base.7 6 Competing theories of aboriginal rights,
contingent versus inherent rights, are not easy to
distinguish. Professors Asch and Macklem believe
the Court in Sparrow set out along the path of inher-
ent nghts, but ultimately crossed to the contingent
rights side and by doing so "severely curtailed the
possibility that section 35(1) includes an aboriginal
right to sovereignty."n
5. Settlement Agreements
The use of negotiated agreements since the
1970s offers an alternative to the uncertainty of the
courtroom. The earliest agreement was specific to
the James Bay hydroelectric development in north-
em Quebec. Apart from the James Bay agreement.
the federal government developed a comprehensive
claims process in the mid 1970s and major agree-
ments have been reached with the Inuit in the west-
em and eastern Arctic, and with the fourteen First
Nations of the Yukon Territory. The recently formed
British Columbia Treaty Commission supersedes
the comprehensive claims process and approaches
the negotiation of claims from a broader perspec-
tive. Each type of agreement will be reviewed briefly
here.
The James Bay agreement represents a project
specific agreement and was only negotiated after
Cree and Inuit peoples claimed unextinguished
aboriginal rights in areas awaiting hydroelectric
development.7 8 In terms of water resources, "the
agreement is more a statement of the rights of the
lames Bay hydro project than it is of the rights with
respect to water of the Cree and lnuit.L 9 The com-
prehensive claims process initiated in 1973 has
yielded three major agreements: The Inuvialuit
(Western Arctic) Final Agreement of 1984. The
Nunavut (Eastern Arctic) Agreement-in-Principle
and the Yukon Umbrella Final Agreement of 1992.
Substantial amounts of land and financial compen-
sation are involved with these agreements. The
Nunavut involves bare title to 350,000 sq. km. and
$580,000,000 [Canadian dollarsl; the Yukon agree-
ment involves title to 41.500 sq. km. and
$242.673.000. but powers with respect to fish.
wildlife, water and the environment are attenuated;
deferential to governmental control.
The Yukon Final Umbrella Agreement of 1992 is
a distinct First Nations Agreement. The Umbrella
Final Agreement does not create or affect any legal
rights, rather it establishes the framework for each
of the fourteen First Nations in the Yukon to secure
Final Agreements and Self-Government agree-
ments.e Regarding water, the Agreement provides
that "the property in Water in the Yukon shall be
determined by Laws of General Application,"i and,
"Government has the right to protect and manage
75. The summary is based on R. v. Sparrow. 70 D.LR. (4th)
at 407-18.
76. W.I.C. Binnie, The Sparrow Dotrinne: Beginning of the End or
End of the Beglnning?. 15 QuEEN's LI. 217 (1990).
77. Asch & Macklem, supra note 67, at 498.
78. BAnxR=. supra note 53. at 220.
79. Id. at 222.
80. Umbrella Final Agreement between the Government of
Canada. The Council for Yukon Indians and the Government of
the Yukon. 30 May 1992. Paragraph 2.2.2. The Gwitchin First
Nation and the Champagne and Alshihlk First Nation entered
Into Final Agreements and Self-Government Agreements in May,
1993. The final agreements incorporate much of the language of
the Umbrella Final Agreement tailored to specific lands and
waters, and other specific concerns of the particular First Nation.
81. Id. at Para. 14.3.1.
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Water and Beds of waterbodies and to use Water
incidental to that right throughout the Yukon."82
Another restriction of the Agreement is that it
allows for expropriation of hydro-electric and water
storage project sites.83 These measures cannot be
characterized as strong affirmations of First Nations
rights, and future agreements might be molded
from a different source.
In the realm of fish and wildlife, the Umbrella
Agreement respects the ultimate jurisdiction of the
relevant Minister.84 The allocation of salmon in the
Yukon (Total Allowable Catch) is set by the Minister,
with Basic Needs receiving priority over other uses.
Yukon First Nations are specifically allotted 26% of
the commercial salmon fishing licenses within the
Yukon River drainage basin. 85 The specific number
of fish allocated is subject to final agreements. In
sum, the Yukon Umbrella covers a broad array of
issues and provides protection of aboriginal fishing,
but self-government powers relating to salmon are
still attenuated. The specific paragraphs relating to
salmon fishing under the Champagne and Aishihik
First Nation Final Agreement are discussed in Part
lI.B. of this Article.
In contrast to the comprehensive claims
process, the British Columbia Treaty Commission
process is more involved and final agreements may
not be forthcoming for some time. As a starting
point, the First Nations of British Columbia have
insisted on a different format than the comprehen-
sive claims process which is viewed as a hierarchi-
cal process of extinguishment ("clearing title") in
exchange for modest monetary benefits.86 A govern-
ment-to-government approach without precondi-
tions has been advocated by the Haida Nation with
the B.C. Treaty Commission serving as an even-
handed facilitator.87 Interim protection for imper-
iled resources up until the time that final agree-
ments take effect is an important sub-process to
flow from this approach.
The interim Gwai Haanas Agreement protecting
the southern archipelago of Haida Gwai (Queen
Charlotte Islands) was made to protect and care for
the subject area.88 The agreement begins by reciting
widely contrasting viewpoints regarding sovereignty
and ownership, but common objectives flow from
the desire of the government to protect the area as
a National Park and the Haida desire to preserve the
territory for the use of all Haida people. Specifically,
the Agreement provides for the establishment of an
Archipelago Management Board (AMB) initially
composed of two representatives from the
Canadian government and two representatives from
the Haida Nation.89 Matters to be considered
include: (a) completing a Management Plan, (b)
maintaining Haida cultural activities and tradition-
al renewable resource harvesting activities, (c) iden-
tifying special-cultural sites, and (d) developing
guidelines, including applications for commercial
tours or use by fisherman. 90 This interim agreement
provides ond indication of what a particular First
Nation wants before moving forward.
II. RESOLUTION OF RESOURCE CONFLICTS
The legal underpinnings of fishing rights
include treaty rights, statutory rights, aboriginal
rights and rights acquired through negotiated set-
tlements. Many of the conflicts over salmon fishing
deal with provincial or state attempts to regulate or
limit Indian fishing. The following section on United
States law follows the development of case law
regarding treaty rights and non-treaty rights, It
examines the related topics of reserved rights,
negotiated settlements, comprehensive manage-
ment, and endangered species. The Canadian sec-
tion summarizes treaty cases, aboriginal rights
cases, the role of self-government, and negotiated
agreements.
A. The United States
I. Treaty Fishing Rights
Formal treaties are equivalent to federal law,
and are regarded as the supreme law of the land
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.9 State laws cannot derogate from or
abrogate these rights. To aid in the interpretation of
Indian treaties and relevant legislation, the
Supreme Court has adopted the following princi-
ples to guide its analysis: (a) ambiguous terms are
to be construed in favor of Native Americans, (b)
ambiguous terms are to be interpreted as Native
82. Id. at para. 14.6.1.
83. Id. at ch. 7, 67-73.
84. Id. at para. 16.3.1.
85. Id. at para. 16.10.1-16.10.20.
86. Miles Richardson, President of the Council of the Haida
Nation, lecture given at the U.B.C. Faculty of Law (Nov. 18, 1993).
87. Id. According to Mr. Richardson, the government
approved of the process on November 16, 1993. Fora critical First
Nations assessment of the Treaty Process. see Sechelt Indian
Band, An Open Letter to the Premier of British Columbia, WEEKEND SUN,
Nov. 20, 1993, at AiS.
88. Gwai Haanas Agreement between The Government of
Canada. represented by the Minister of the Environment, and The
Council of the Haida Nation, signed 30 March 1993.
89. Id. at para. 4.4.
90. Id. at para. 4.3.
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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Americans would have understood them, and (c)
extinguishment of rights is not to be implied lightly
(express extinguishment is highly preferred).92 In
United States v. Winans,9 3 the Supreme Court ampli-
fied these guidelines:
IW]e will construe a treaty with the Indians
as "that unlettered people" understood it,
and "as justice and reason demand in all
cases where power is exerted by the strong
over those to whom they owe care and pro-
tection," and counterpoise the inequality
"by the superior lustice which looks only to
the substance of the right, without regard
to technical rules."
9 4
The Winans Court held that the Yakima treaty right
to take fish at all usual and accustomed places
established an equitable servitude across any pri-
vate property between the Indians and their fishing
stations.9' The court defined the treaty as a reserva-
tion of rights by the Indians and not a grant of rights
to the Indians.9 6
The access rights recognized in Winans were
later extended to lands not expressly covered by the
treaties, but which were nonetheless usual and
accustomed fishing grounds.97 In considering the
extent of allowable state regulation of treaty fishing,
the Supreme Court has held that state license fees
could not be imposed for treaty fishing, but purely
regulatory measures, as necessary for the conserva-
tion of fish, could be instituted.98 To define what
regulation was "necessary." the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals required the state to prove that there is
a need to limit the taking of fish, and that the par-
ticular regulation sought to be imposed is indis-
pensable to the accomplishment of the needed lim-
itation w A facially neutral state regulation, dispro-
portionately affecting treaty fishing, is invalid.co
After Oregon and Washington state agencies
failed to adequately apportion the fishery, the fed-
eral courts essentially took over administration of
the fishery to ensure that Native Americans received
their treaty share. In Sofiappy v. Srmith, Judge Robert
Belloni set substantive and procedural standards to
assist Oregon in assigning a fair share of the harvest
to treaty fisherman.1i Five years later in United States
v. Washington, ludge George Boldt apportioned the
treaty fishery and non-native fishery on an equal
(50%-50%) basis.102 To enforce the Boldt decision,
two Ninth Circuit cases 0 3 and one Supreme Court
decision' 04 were required. A second phase of United
States v. Washington was initiated to decide what
habitat conservation and environmental protection
measures were required to protect the treaty fishing
rights.10' However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
environmental servitudes that were imposed on the
State by the district court. 06
Along with the technical holdings of United
States v. Washington, Judge Boldt discussed the topic
of Native self-government. "salmon were neverwan-
tonly wasted and that Water pollution was not per-
mitted during the salmon season.. .intra-tribal
trade was substantial... land] Indian fishing
increased in order to accommodate increased
demand for local non-Indian consumption and for
export.... 1 07 To allow for modem self-regulation,
Judge Boldt listed several criteria, that if satisfied,
would permit a tribe to govern their use of the fish-
ery. The tribe shall have: competent and responsi-
ble leadership, well organized tribal government
reasonably competent to promulgate and apply
92. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. 397 U.S. 620, 630-31
(1970). Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404.
406 (1968); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States. 318 U.S.
423. 431 (1943); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
93. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
94. Id. at 380 (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States. 119
U.S. 1 (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 174 U.S. I (1899)).
95. Id. at 381.
96. Id.
97. Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States. 249 V.S. 194 (1919).
98. Tulee v. Washington. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
99. Matson v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, 314 F.2d 169. 172 (9th Cir. 1963).
100. Department of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe
(Puyallup I1). 414 U.S. 44. 48 (1973).
101. Sohappy v. Smith. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). As
reported in an unpublished judgment, the substantive standards
were: (1) the regulations had to be the least restrictive that could
be imposed consistent with assunng necessary fish for spawning;
(2) the state had to deal with the treaty fishery separately and dis-
tinctly from other fisheries; and (3) the regulations had to assure
the tribes 'a fair share of the harvest. The procedural standards
were: (1) notice to the tribes; (2) an opportunity for the tribes to
be heard; and (3) an opportunity to participate meaningfully in
the states regulatory process. Sohappy v. Smith. No. 68-409 (D.
Or. Oct. 10. 1969).
102. United States v. Washington. 384 E Supp. 312 (.D.
Wash. 1974).
103. 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), crt. dnlzd. 423 US. 1086
(1976); PugetSound GillnettersAss'n v. United States Dist.Court.
573 E2d 1123 (9th Cim 1978). a!?g 459 E Supp. 1020 (V.D. Wash.
1978).
104. ashington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
105. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187. 202-08
(W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd In par & rr/d In plar. 694 F.2d 1374(9th Cir
1982). ci. denlrd, 474 U.S. 994 (1985).
106. United States v. Washington. 759 F.2d 1353. 1357 (9th
Cir. 1985) (en banc). "it. denmIrd. 474 U.S. 994 (1985).




tribal off reservation fishing regulations that, if
strictly enforced, will not adversely affect conserva-
tion, Indian personnel trained for and competent to
provide effective enforcement of all tribal fishing
regulations, well qualified experts in fishery science
and management who are either on the tribal staff
or whose services are arranged for and readily avail-
able to the tribe, an officially approved tribal mem-
bership roll, and provision for tribal membership
certification, with individual identification by pho-
tograph, in a suitable form that shall be carried on
the person of each tribal member when approach-
ing, fishing in or leaving either on or off reservation
waters.108
To ensure coordination with other governmen-
tal agencies, Judge Boldt required the tribe to: pro-
vide for full and complete tribal fishing regulations
which, before adoption, have been discussed in its
proposed final form with Fisheries and Game, and
include therein any state regulation which has been
established to the satisfaction of the tribe, or upon
hearing by or under direction of this court, to be
reasonable and necessary for conservation, permit
monitoring of off-reservation Indian fishing by
Fisheries and Game to the extent reasonable and
necessary for conservation, and provide for fish
catch reports, as to both on and off reservation
treaty right fishing, when requested by Fisheries or
Game for the purpose of establishing escapement
goals and other reasonable and necessary conser-
vation purposes.1 9
The apportionment of the fishery, Native self-
regulation and servitudes across private property
are all rights derived from judicial holdings rather
than explicit treaty rights. These implied rights are
widely recognized. However, delineating the scope
and nature of those rights is contentious and often
108. Id. at 340-41.
109. Id.
110. United States v. Wilson. 611 F. Supp. 813. 819 (1985).
The fishing nghts at issue were not treaty rights. The Klamath
River and Hoopa Valley Reservations were created pursuant to
executive orders and statutes. 'Nonetheless the fact that the
reservation when created was npanan to the Klamath River leads
Inescapably to the conclusion that the nght to take fish from the
river was reserved to the tribe and that the Indians understood
the reservation to include the rights to take fish." Id. at 818.
111. "In establishing the Hoopa Valley Reservation.
Congress reserved those rights necessary for the Indians to main-
tain on the land ceded to them their way of life, which included
hunting and fishing." Id. at 817 (citing Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968)).
112. United States v. Eberhardt, 789 E2d 1354. 1356 (9th Cir.
1986). The Department of the Intenor began regulating Indian
fishing on the Hoopa Valley Reservation in response to Arnett v.
Five Gill Nets. 48 Cal. App. 3d 454 (1975). which prevented state
regulation within the reservation. The court found that the statu-
tory delegation of powers in 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (1994) for executive
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perpetuates tense relations between Native
Americans and non-native persons. Reserved rights
and incidental rights are reviewed in more depth
later in this section.
2. Non-Treaty Fishing Rights
When non-treaty rights are at issue, the courts
have been less consistent and more deferential to
government. In United States v. Wilson, the district
court held that Department of Interior regulations
suspending commercial fishing by Yurok Indians on
the Klamath River in northern California constitut-
ed a substantial infringement of fishing rights
where the anadramous fish were not in danger of
extinction.11 0 Washington case law was applied by
the district court to the Yurok's reserved tribal fish-
ing rights and the contested regulation was ruled
invalid." I But consistency between treaty and non-
treaty Indians is not to be expected in the splintered
doctrine of "Indian law." The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals promptly reversed Wilson on completely dif-
ferent grounds,1 2 holding "that the statutory provi-
sions authorizing [the Department of] Interior to
manage Indian affairs permit the regulation of fish-
ing on the Hoopa Valley Reservation," and refused
to look at modification or abrogation of reserved
fishing rights. 13 The court only looked at whether
Interior had exceeded their statutory authority, "the
validity of the moratorium depends on whether
Congress has given Interior express or implied
authority to regulate Indian fishing."'" 4 By doing so,
the Ninth Circuit implicitly adopted different law for
reserved rights than for treaty rights.
In Alaska, much the same result was reached
regarding state regulation of non-treaty Indian fish-
ing practices. In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, the
Supreme Court held that "state laws may be applied
management of Indian affairs gave Interior plenary administrative
authority.
113. Eberhardt,789 F.2d at 1360. The existence of federally
recognized commercial fishing rights was not at issue, only the
extent to which government could regulate those rights.
114. Id. at 1359. The "proper standard" was deemed to be the
administrative law test of arbitrary and capricious or discrimina-
tory, id. at 1362, a test which rarely falls. The concurring opinion
of lustice Beezer identified the primary cause of the conflict:
ITlhe Indian defendants in this case quite properly claim
that, since the Department of Commerce falls to provide
for adequate escapement from the coastal waters Idue
to offshore commercial fishing], the Indians on the
Hoopa Valley Reservation must bear most of the burden
of conservation measures the trust duty to reservation
Indians is owed, not just by the Department of the
intenor, but by the entire federal government.
Id. at 1363. The Pacific Fisheries Management Council subse-
quently restricted ocean fishing to enable the Yurok and Hoopa
Indians to increase their catch.
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to Indians unless such application would interfere
with reservation self-government or impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law. Congress has
neither authorized the use of fish traps at Kake and
Angoon nor empowered the Secretary of the
Interior to do so."1i 5 But in the companion case of
Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, a different result
was reached on similar facts because the Annette
Islands were set apart as a reserve by Congress for
the Metlakatlas.ii 6 The Court held that the State
could not ban the use of fish traps near the
Metlakatla reservation on Annette Island and it was
for the Secretary of Interior to decide if fish traps
would be allowed.ii 7 Recalling that aboriginal title
in Alaska was not expressly extinguished until 1971.
the treaty distinction is difficult to reconcile. The
trust duty owed by the federal government to Native
Americans is not predicated on having a treaty.
3. Reserved Rights, Incidental Rights and Negotiated
Agreements
Incidental habitat protection rights, reserved
rights and Winters rights are worthy of a separate
paper because -they represent the outer reaches of
water resource and fishery law. Treaty rights and
implied reservation rights have been successfully
asserted to "stop construction of dams, change the
operation of existing dams and limit irrigation with-
drawals to maintain river flows necessary for fish
propagation."i 18 Many persons are opposed to the
uncertainty that incidental treaty rights and
reserved water rights cast over their economic inter-
ests, but advocates of such nghts counter with the
"homelands" theory, namely that the purpose of
treaties was to preserve, sustain and further a
115. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan. 369 U.S. 60. 75-76
(1962).
116. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan. 369 U.S. 45 48
(1962). The treaty was previously interpreted, to grant exclusive
use of the surrounding waters and submerged lands to the
Metlakatlas. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States. 248 U.S. 78
(1918).
117. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan. 369 U.S. 45. 59
(1962). Granting the Metlakatlas more substantive rights than the
Tlingits is ironic because the Metlakatla people immigrated from
British Columbia in 1887 and are not native to Alaska.
118. Michael C. Blumm. Why Study Paric Salmon Law?. 22
IDAHo L. REv. 629. 637 (1986) (citing Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla v. Alexander. 440 E Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977)); Kittitas
Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist.. 763 F2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1985); Confederated Tribes of Umatilla v. Callaway.
No. 72-211 (D. Or:Aug. 17. 1973); United States v. Adair. 723 E2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1983); Colyille Confederated Tribes v. Walton. 752
F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Anderson. No. 3643 (E.D.
Wash. luly 23, 1979).
119. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System. 753 P.2d 76 (Iyo. 1988). cert
granted in part. Wyoming v. United States. 488 U.S. 1040 (1989).
tribe's cultural and economic existence, and conse-
quently reservation resources and ancillary off-
reservation resources should be prioritized for
Native use.
After advancing the Winters doctrine for much
of this century, the Supreme Court now seems to be
wavering. In In re General Adjudication of Big Horn River
System. the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the
Cheyenne Arapaho cannot transfer or use their agri-
cultural allotment for instream fishery purposes
without the consent of the Wyoming state engi-
neer.ii 9 The Wyoming Court ruled that tribal
reserved fishery rights did not exist because the
importance of fishing to the traditional lifestyle was
attenuated. The U.S. Supreme Court split 4-4 on the
decision that effectively affirmed the Wyoming
court. 20 And in an earlier case involving the
Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation in Nevada,
reserved rights were also limited when the
Department of Interior failed to secure a reserved
water right for fishery purposes and only reserved
water for agricultural purposes during an adjudica-
tion of rights.i2 1 The doctrine of res judicata was
invoked to bar the Paiute from subsequently claim-
ing reserved rights for fishery purposes.
The climate of uncertainty, with such valuable
resources at stake, has created a strong incentive to
negotiate an acceptable outcome. Several negotiat-
ed agreements have been formed, 122 but the terms
of the agreements vary and generalizations are not
easy to make. The most contentious subject is off-
reservation leasing or sale of water in arid
Southwestern regions. Critics argue that such a pur-
pose was never contemplated during treaty negoti-
ations nor should it be considered now. Advocates
afl'd by an equally divided Court. 492 US. 406 (1989). In the con-
text of a general adjudication of an entire river system. state
courts have jurisdiction over Indian water nghts pursuant to the
McCarren Amendment. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). In all other con-
texts Native Americans may seek the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
120. Wyoming v. United States. 492 US. 406 (1989).
121. Nevada v. United States. 463 U.S. 110 (19831.
122. Ste Fort Peck-Montana Compact (May 15. 19851;
Southern Arizona water Rights Settlement Act. Pub. L No.
97-293. tit. III, 96 Stat. 1274 (1982); Ak-Chin Water Rights
Settlement Act. Pub. L No. 95-328. 92 Stat. 409 (1978). revised
Pub. L No. 98-530. 98 Stat. 2698 (1934). San Luis Rey Indian
Water Rights Settlement Act. Pub. L No. 100-675. tit. I. 102 Stat
4000 (19883: Slat River Pima - Maricopa Indian Community Water
Rights Settlement Act. Pub. L No, 100--512. I02Stat. 2549 (19381:
Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-602.
104 Stat. 3059 (IM)0 Fort McDowell Indian Community Water
Rights Settlement Pub. L No. 101-628, tit. IV. 104 Stat. 4480
(1990): note 112. Joseph R. Membrno. Indian RMmedVlaterRwis,
Federalsm and Ife Trust Resyo r siity. 27 LniD WATR L Rev. 1 (1992.
See also Susan D. Brienza. wet Wvattr vs. Paper Rghis: l .din and Non-
Indian Nr;2ltatdSfIlirznts andTfnr Effets, 11 STAm. Err. LI. 151.
168-99 (1992).
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of expanstve rights contend that the government
did not intend to freeze the Native culture in time
and selling water may be the best way to further
tribal interests. One positive uncontested result is
the establishment and recognition of tribal water
management authorities in these agreements,
which often furthers self-government. The Fort Peck
agreement is often held out as a model. Native
communities are arguably in a better position to
protect water resource and fishery needs in their
area than the federal government acting from a dis-
tance to fulfill its trust responsibility.
A statutory regime established pursuant to
1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act expressly
give tribes the status of states to set standards for
reservation waters, thereby sublecting upstream
sources to Native regulation. That Native regulatory
regimes may be better able to protect their people
is exemplified by typical risk assessments conduct-
ed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
which are based on the public at large rather than
high risk communities. In specific areas like the
Puget Sound Region of Washington, Native
Americans consume ten to fifty times the amount of
fish eaten by the "general public." 23 Thus, native
regulation of water quality may provide a better
means of assuring clean water to all people in the
United States.
4. Comprehensive Management
Interpreting fishing rights in an environment of
diminished stocks is difficult. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that treaty rights do not allow for
extinction of the fish,24 but did so without address-
ing a more substantive cause of the fishery declines,
offshore commercial fishing in British Columbia
and Alaska. The scope of the problem exceeded the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but addressing
offshore fisheries is fundamental to fulfilling treaty
obligations. To remedy the problem an internation-
al solution was required. The United States -
Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) of 1985125 cul-
minated a long negotiation process aimed at incor-
porating tribal and state concerns into the manage-
ment of an international fishery.
One of the driving forces behind the treaty was
the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fishing Council's
(CRITFC) threat to sue Alaska to bring the state
within the holding of United States v. Washington which
requires an equal apportionment of the Washington
fishery.126 The CRITFC is an umbrella organization
composed of representatives from the Umatilla
(OR), Warm Springs (OR), Yakima (WA) and Nez
Perce (ID) Indian Reservations. To further treaty
fishing rights the CRITFC has sought management
of the ocean harvest to allow for sufficient upstream
escapement, an increase in numbers through care-
fully planned hatchery programs, and improvement
in smolts survivability during their downstream
migration.127 A stipulation decree approved in
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation
v. Baldndge128 included Alaska within the PST in
exchange for an Agreement Not to Sue. In the early
1980s, Alaskan trollers were taking over eighty per-
cent of the total American harvest of several chi-
nook stocks.1
29
The PST is aimed at promoting the optimum
production of salmon stocks and reducing intercep-
tions of particular salmon stocks. The Commission
established to oversee the program is comprised of
American members (four states, Indian tribes and
the federal government) and the federal govern-
ment of Canada. Important provisions of the Treaty
include Article XI: "This Treaty shall not be inter-
preted or applied so as to affect or modify existing
aboriginal rights or rights established in existing
Indian treaties and other existing federal law;"
Article VI, paragraph 4, "The Fraser River Panel and
the Commission shall take into account and seek
consistency with existing aboriginal rights, rights
established in existing Indian treaties and domestic
allocation oblectives;" Article VII, which recognizes
Canada's right to an equalization of catch in trans-
boundary rivers arising in Canada, but flowing to
the sea through the United States (i.e., Alsek,
Stikine, Taku, Yukon); and importantly a twenty-five
123. Shukovsky P., Tribes Take on Pollution, SEATrL.E PosT-
INTELUGENCER, Sept. 7. 1993, at Al. The first test case where a trib-
al regulation has been challenged is in New Mexico where the
Pueblo Isleta Tribe is trying to enforce its standards, which are
higher than the states, on the city of Albuquerque which releas-
es sewage treatment effluent upstream. Albuquerque maintains
that the cost of compliance is $250 million, but the EPA is siding
with the Pueblo Isleta Tribe. The case is being watched closely by
Native Americans. Critics contend that with 275 eligible tribes
instead of having 50 states, 325 entities will be empowered to
regulate water quality.
124. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of
Washington (Puyallup i11), 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
125. Bilateral Pacific Salmon Interception Agreement, Jan.
28, 1985, U.S.-Can., Treaty Doc. 99-2.
126. Sharon A. O'Brien, Undercurrents in International Law., Tate
of Two Treaties, 9 CAN.-U.S. L.I. 1,32-33 (1985). If brought within the
holding of United States v. Washington, Alaskan fisherman would
have to reduce their catch of Washington chinook by 40--50%
(many chinook species from Puget Sound and the Columbia River
mature in Alaskan waters before returning to spawn), The PST
was viewed as the lesser of two evils,
127. Id. at 10-11.
128. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. Baldndge. 605 F. Supp, 833 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
129. O'Brien. supra note 126, at 32.
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percent reduction of the chinook catch by Alaskan
and British Columbian fishermen.i
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Another comprehensive effort is the 1980
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act which established the Council of
the same name. 131 The Council's mandate includes
protection, mitigation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife affected by development, operation and
management of hydroelectric facilities while provid-
ing adequate, efficient, economical and reliable
power.132 The Fish and Wildlife Program of 1982 was
aimed at increasing water flows for the downstream
smolt migration, improving fish passage and
enhancing habitat.133 Offshore, the role of the
Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) is
also important to the management of anadramous
fisheries.
Lastly, the issue of inter-tribal/intra-tribal con-
flict is raised. The newer, mechanized, ocean-going
boats capable of catching large numbers of fish do
not resemble traditional native fishing methods.
Marine commercial fishing in the Puget Sound area
can intercept fish bound for the "usual and accus-
tomed" fishing grounds in shoreline or river areas,
fish bound for tribal waters in southern Puget
Sound, and Canadian sockeye bound for the Fraser
River.134 The issue is raised here only to suggest that
Native fishing rights may need to evolve further to
protect the rights of all First Nations people.
5. Endangered Species
One situation that unfortunately must be con-
sidered is what to do if salmon stocks are ever list-
ed as threatened or endangered species under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). 135 The winter run of
Sacramento River chinook salmon has already been
listed as a threatened species pursuant to an emer-
gency rule.136 Whether treaty rights would be abro-
gated by a listing remains uncertain because "treaty
rights do not allow for the extinction of a
species."137 In United States v. Dion . 8 the Supreme
Court reviewed the conviction of a Yankton Sioux
130. Joy A. Yanagida. The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 Ai. 1. Ires'L L
577(1987).
131. Northwest PowerAct of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-501.32.94
Stat. 2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1994)).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (1994).
133. O'Bnen, supra note 126. at 20.
134. Michael R. Anderson, Law and the Protection of Cultural
Communities: The Case of Native American Fishing Rights. 9 L & Pot:y
125 (1987). Anderson argues that the Boldt decision and subse-
quent cases did not effectively protect traditional fishing nghts
despite the increased well being of some tribal members.
135. Pub. L No. 93-205. 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
Indian who was charged with killing four bald eagles
and selling body parts. To test for treaty abrogation
the Court wrote 'what is essential is clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the conflict
between its intended action on the one hand and
Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty
right." ' Indian fishing could legally continue after
a listing pursuant to an ESA consultation process.
but the mixture of treaty rights and wildlife laws is
an area without much precedent. Congressional
consideration of potential conflicts prior to listing
could alleviate much of the uncertainty. Preventing
Native Americans from engaging in an activity that
they have participated in for centuries is a con-
tentious matter.
Alternatively a claim could be laid against the
government for failing to institute proper conserva-
tion measures to adequately protect treaty rights. In
United States v. Washington, Judge Orrick made two
important rulings: hatchery-bred and artificially-
propagated fish were embraced by the treaties, and
the right to have the fishery habitat protected from
man-made despoliation was implicit in the treaty
fishing clause.4 3 One impediment to suit is that as
a condition for continued Department of Justice
representation in Phase If. treaty Indians apparent-
ly agreed not to sue for damages previously suffered
due to governmental actions.14 1 The reasons for
fishery declines are numerous and causation issues
would be problematic in a damages suit. Expensive
lawsuits may not be preferable to mitigation and
other forms of compensation if acceptable agree-
ments can be worked out.
B. Canada
The Canadian courts have reviewed numerous
fishing and hunting rights cases. The decisions gen-
erally breaks down into two types of cases, aborigi-
nal rights and treaty nghts. The mode of judicial
interpretation has changed since the Constitution
Act of 1982, but the categories remain distinct. This
136, 54 Fed. Reg. 32.085. 32.035-88 (1939) (amending 50
C.R. §§ 226-27 (1994)).
137. Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n. 443 US. 658 (1979). However. if
the extinction of the species isdue pnmarilyto causesotherthan
Indian fishing, treaty rights may provide substantial legal redress.
Unfortunately. possessing legal rights is not the same as pos-
sessing fish.
138. United States v. Dion. 476 US. 734 (1986).
139. Id. at 739-40.
140. United States v. State of Washington. 506 E Supp 187.
197. 202 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
141. CoHv., supra note 28. at 139.
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section reviews the two categories of cases, then
discusses the role of self government and the devel-
opment of settlement agreements. Because much
of British Columbia and the Yukon are not covered
by treaties, there are few treaty cases. To compen-
sate for this, hunting rights cases from other juris-
dictions are presented, where similar legal method-
olgy is employed.
1. Treaty Analysis
As typified by Simon v. The Queen, the Supreme
Court concentrates on the following questions to
decide whether valid treaty rights have been
infringed upon by provincial legislation: Was the
Treaty validly created by competent parties? Was
the right to hunt included in the Treaty? And what is
the nature or scope of that right? Has the Treaty
been terminated or otherwise limited? Is the appel-
lant covered by the Treaty' Is the Treaty a "treaty"
within the meaning of section 88 of the Indian Act?
Do treaty rights contained in the Treaty exempt the
appellant from prosecution under provincial legis-
lation, specifically section 150(1) of the Lands and
Forest Act? 142 In Simon, Chief Justice Dickson writing
for the Court interpreted the provincial legislation
at issue as a restriction on the appellant's right to
hunt under the treaty, and thus prohibited by sec-
tion 88 of the Indian Act. 143 An important aspect of
the decision was the Court's recognition of inciden-
tal rights; "the right to hunt to be effective must
embody those activities reasonably incidental to
the act of hunting itself...."144
Relying on Simon, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, in Saanichton Bay Manna v. Claxton, enjoined
the construction of a marina because it would inter-
fere with the treaty right "to carry on our fishery as
formerly" 145 The court enumerated the following
principles of treaty interpretation to support its
conclusion:
The treaty should be given a fair, large and
liberal construction in favour of the
Indians; treaties must be construed not
according to the technical meaning of their
Volue 3, N=bW 1
words, but in the sense that they would
naturally be understood by the Indians; as
the honour of the Crown is always involved,
no appearance of "sharp dealing" should
be sanctioned; any ambiguity in wording
shall be interpreted as against the drafters
and should not be interpreted to the preju-
dice of the Indians if another construction
is reasonably possible; and evidence by
conduct or otherwise as to how the parties
understood the treaty is of assistance in
giving it content. 146
The court explicitly recognized incidental rights: "the
nght granted by the treaty is broader than the words of the
treaty may on their face indicate, the right to carry on the
fishery encompasses other rights which are inciden-
tal." 47 The marina construction would have
adversely affected the stationary crab fishery, eel
grass beds, shellfish, sea run cut-throat trout and
rights of access for Band members1 48 Thus, the
breadth and scope of rights secured to the Tsawout
Band were defined by the biological well being of
the fishery.
Prior to Simon and Saanrchton Bay Manna treaty
analysis often went against First Nations. In The
Queen v. Syliboy, 49 the Nova Scotia court concluded
that the appellant was not covered by the 1752
Treaty asserted in his defense, and upheld a convic-
tion under the Migratory Birds Convention Act,
which did not provide an exception for Indian hunt-
ing.150 In interpreting the rights under Treaty No. 11,
the court recognized the right of Indians to hunt and
fish for food on unoccupied Crown land, but sus-
tained the conviction because the Act was con-
strued as an extinguishment of treaty rights.15i And
in Pawis v. The Queen.,152 the Court held that the
Ojibiway defendants could not use the 1850
Ojibiway Treaty in their defense. "The Crown cannot
be treated here as having brought upon itself the
reprobation of the law."153 "On the one hand, the
plaintiffs would not, it seems to me, have had the
status to sue as individuals. The Treaty, by its terms,
is made with the Ojibiway people collectively."1"4
142. Simon v. R. (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 190, at 398-99
(S.C.C.). Simon was charged with possession of a .243 caliber
rifle, spent shells, live shells and two 12 gauge shotgun shells
larger than AAA during a closed season. He was arrested on lands
just outside his reserve.
143. Id. at 413. See supra note 59 and accompanying text for
the language of § 88.
144. Simon v. R., 24 D.L.R. (4th) at 403. "lilt is implicit in the
right granted under art. 4 of the Treaty of 1752 that the appellant
has the right to possess a gun and ammunition in a safe manner
in order to be able to exercise the nght to hunt.- Id.
145. Saanichton Bay Marina v. Claxton (1987), 36 B.C.L.R.79
(B.C. CA).
146. Id. at 84-85.
147. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 91.
149. R. v. Syliboy (1929), I D.L.R. 307 (N.S. Co, Ct.).
150. R. v. Sikyea (1964),43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 (N.W.T.CA), aftd,
50 D.LR. (2d) 80.
151. Id. at 158.
152. Pawis v. R. (1979). 102 D.L.R. (3d) 602 (F.C, TD.).
153. Id. at 611.
154. Id. at 611-12.
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Importantly, these three cases were decided before
1982 and they are not Supreme Court cases.
A key Supreme Court concept regarding treaty
righti is coexistence where non-native uses of
land/resources and compatible First Nations uses
are encouraged within the same area; a break from
earlier cases where exclusivity was emphasized. In
The Queen v. Siou, a case decided at the same time as
Sparrow. the Supreme Court held that if the customs
or rights at issue were not incompatible with the
particular use made by the Crown, and did not seri-
ously compromise the Crown's objective in occupy-
ing. the violation should be set aside. 15 To reach
this conclusion Lamer I. began "treaties and
statutes relating to Indians should be liberally con-
strued and uncertainties resolved in favour of the
Indians." 56 Applying this principle, he wrote:
I1In view of the absence of any express
mention of the territorial scope of the
treaty, it has to be assumed that the parties
to the treaty of September 5th intended to
reconcile the Hurons' need to protect the
exercise of their customs and the desire of
the British conquerors to expand.
Protecting the exercise of the customs in
all parts of the territory frequented when it
is not incompatible with its occupancy is in
my opinion the most reasonable way of
reconciling the competing interests.
157
2. Aboriginal Rights Analysis
The treaty analysis employed in Canada is rela-
tively doctrinal when compared to aboriginal rights
analysis. Contrasting theories of aboriginal title and
the implications of recognizing expansive legal
rights in the era of section 35 have led to a cautious
approach and inconsistent judicial treatment.
Aboriginal fishing rights will continue to evolve
rapidly. The change brought about by section 35 and
the breadth of Sparrow are enough to render pre- 1982
aboriginal rights cases outdated. The analytical
framework of Sparrow has already been discussed in
Part I.B. This section presents the application of that
framework to the alleged fishing violation.
The appellant, Sparrow, a member of the
Musqueam Indian Band in Vancouver. was charged
under section 61(1) of the Fisheries Act for fishing
with a drift net. forty-five fathoms in length, in viola-
155. R. v. Siom (1990). 70 D.LR. (4th) 427 at 463 (S.C.c.).
156. Id. at 435.
157. Id. at 463.
158. R. v. Sparrow (1990). 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 389-90.
159. Id. at 390.
tion of restrictions on his Indian food fishing license
which specified a maximum length of twenty-five
fathoms.15" Sparrow defended on the basis that he
was exercising an aboriginal right to fish and the net
length restriction was inconsistent with section 35(1)
of the Constitution Act of 1982 and hence invalid. 159
As previously noted "existing" aboriginal rights can-
not be read as to incorporate the specific manner in
which the right was regulated before 1982.
On appeal, the scope of Sparrow's aboriginal
right was expanded to embrace commercial fishing.
But because it was not raised in the lower courts the
Supreme Court did not take up the issue. The Court
had little trouble in finding that the historic and
contemporary taking of salmon formed an integral
part of the Musqueam culture, one of the apparent
benchmarks of an aboriginal right, but the Court
was reluctant to precisely define the right. "While it
is impossible to give an easy definition of fishing
rights, it is ...crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal
perspective...of the Irightl at stake.' 163The meaning
of that phrase is not easy to interpret because the
Canadian judiciary has had trouble with aboriginal
perspectives in previous cases.
The next step undertaken by the Court was to
examine whether the purpose or effect of the
restriction on net length unnecessarily infringed the
interest protected by the fishing right. "If, for exam-
ple, the Musqueam were forced to spend undue
time and money per fish caught or if the net length
reduction resulted in a hardship to the Musqueam
in catching fish. then the first branch of the section
35(1) analysis would be met.-161 The justification of
conservation and resource management was
deemed appropriate, but the Court recognized that
"assessing . . conservation in a heavily used mod-
em fishery inevitably blurs with the efficient alloca-
tion of this scarce and valued resource." 62 The solu-
tion was to demand that there be a link between the
question of justification and the allocation of prior-
ities. 'The constitutional nature of the Musqueam
food fishing rights means that any allocation of pri-
orities after valid conservation measures have been
implemented must give top priority to Indian food
fishing." 63 At the end of the day. the Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeal decision to set aside
the conviction, calling for a new trial to allow find-
ings of fact to determine infringement and justifica-
tion pursuant to the enumerated tests.i6
160. Id. at 411.
161. U at 412.
162. Id. at 413.
163. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 417.
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The post-1982 trend reflected by case law has
furthered aboriginal fishing rights even to the detri-
ment of competing uses. In Pasco v. Canadian National
Railway Co., a case involving reserved, non-treaty
fishing rights, the double tracking of an existing rail
line was enjoined when the Oregon lack Creek Band
asserted a proprietary salmon fishing right in the
Thompson River.165 The Appellate Court stressed
the importance of the interpretive principles
(canons of construction) used in treaty cases and
recalled that "Indian reserves were reduced in size
on the grounds that the Indian people did not rely
on agriculture, and that so long as their fisheries
were preserved their need for land was mini-
mal....i,66 "lTlheir rights to fishing stations and
hunting grounds should not be interfered with, and
they should receive every assurance of perfect free-
dom from future encroachments of every descrip-
tion." 67 The reasoning of this case would provide
strong protection for fishing rights even in the
absence of section 35.
3. Self-Regulation Rights
One contentious issue that received only mini-
mal treatment in Sparrow was self regulation.
Fishing rights and self regulation rights are parts of
the same culture and are difficult to analyze sepa-
rately. As supported by Sparrow and the intervener,
the National Indian Brotherhood Assembly of First
Nations, the right to regulate the fishery and to
exercise band discretion over the resource itself is
an aboriginal right. 168 Acknowledging such a right
could effectively limit existing provincial and feder-
al legislative power whereas fishing rights are not as
threatening to governmental power. Aboriginal self
government is not acceptable to many people in
Canada. However, until aboriginal claims are settled
the issue is not likely to go away, it is one of the cor-
nerstones of First Nations policies. If aboriginal
rights do not include self government section 35
could ring hollow.
The decision not to squarely address self gov-
ernment was somewhat suprising because at least
one earlier decision did just that. In 1979, in refer-
ence to the Cowichan band on Vancouver Island,
165. Pasco v. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co., 119861 1 C.N.L.R. 34
(B.C.CA), aff g I C.N.L.R. (B.C.S.C.).
166. Id. at 41.
167. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
the Secretary of the Interior (1876).
168. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R. (4th) at 403-04.
169. lack v. R. (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 193 at 206.
170. In 1986 the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en enacted by-laws
to exclusively regulate the salmon fishery of the Skeena River in
their territory under the authority of § 81(1)(o) of the Indian Act,
the Court acknowledged that "it appears that the
Indians themselves practiced some form of self-
imposed discipline for conservation purposes." 69
After Sparrow, the courts have continued to struggle,
In 1991, the court decided Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia. The case was based on a claim brought by
35 Gitksan and 13 Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs,
who asserted absolute ownership over approxi-
mately 22,000 square miles in northwestern British
Columbia based on occupation and possession
since time immemorial. 70 The trial judge concluded
that all aboriginal rights were extinguished,17 In
June, 1993 a divided appellate court upheld the trial
court on the issue of absolute ownership, but
reversed on other unextinguished aboriginal rights,
including subsistence fishing rights.12 The Court of
Appeals spent considerable time considering abo-
riginal self regulation, MacFarlane I. writing:
ITlhose traditions, rules, and regulations
cannot operate if they are in conflict with
the laws of the province or of Canada. In
1871, when British Columbia joined Ithel
Confederation, legislative power was divid-
ed between Canada and the provinces. The
division exhausted the source of such
power. Any form of Indian self-government,
then existing was superseded by the
Constitution Act, 1867.... The development
and recognition of a parallel system of
Indian laws in certain areas is a matter for
consultation and for legislative action. 173
And on the dissenting side, Lambert J. wrote:
I would declare that the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en peoples had, at the time of
sovereignty, in 1846, aboriginal rights of
self-government and self-regulation relat-
ing to their own society.. .except for (a) any
rights which were related to Sovereignty
and so were inconsistent with British
Sovereignty over the Territory; (b) any of
those rights which would at the that time
have been repugnant to natural justice,
R.S.C. chs. I-6 (1970). but the federal Minister of Indian Affairs
vetoed the regulatory scheme and an ex parte in)unction was
obtained to prevent implementation. That incident was one pre-
cursor to this suit.
171. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D LR (4th)
185 at 198 (B.C.SC.).
172. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D,LR,
(4th) 470 at 480-548 (B.C.C.A.) Ileave to appeal to S.CC. granted
109 D.L.R. (4th) viii (reasons for judgment of Mr. Justice
MacFarlane).




equity, and good conscience, and have not
since then so modified themselves as to
overcome that repugnancy; and (c) any of
those rights which were contrary to the part
of the common law that was not from local
circumstances inapplicable to the territory
and to the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peo-
ples and their institutions.174
Such divergent viewpoints, neither of which applied
the interpretive framework of Sparrow, should be of
concern for those advocating that the Supreme
Court strengthen self-government in the context of
section 35. The consequences of recognizing self-
government rights could be sweeping, but the judi-
ciary thus far has exhibited a cautious approach.
Negotiated agreements between First Nations and
the federal and provincial governments may result
in more substantive changes.
4. Commercial Fishing Rights
Another key argument avoided in Sparrow was
aboriginal commercial fishing rights. In contrast to
Native American commercial fishing below the 49th
parallel. Canadian regulation does not recognize
First Nations commercial fishing. It is difficult to
predict how the Supreme Court might rule after
Sparrow, but their chance to do so may be coming
soon. A divided British Columbia Appellate Court
recently affirmed a conviction against two Upper
Sto:lo Nation defendants who were prosecuted for
illegally selling fish in contravention of their food
fish licenses and who defended on the basis of abo-
riginal fishing rights.' 7 ' In applying Sparrow.
MacFarlane, J. for the majority concluded that the
asserted aboriginal right to fish commercially was
not integral but only incidental to the distinctive
culture of the aboriginal society.176
Lambert, I. in dissent criticized the majority for
relying on a frozen rights, pre-contact approach and
found that "the aboriginal people caught as many
fish as they wanted to catch, limited only by the
abundance of the particular run, and subject to a
sufficient escapement for conservation purpos-
es."1 After European contact, the Sto:lo Nation
increased their catch and took advantage of benefi-
cial commerce, but the majority confined their
analysis to the time that sovereignty was asserted
(deemed to be the enactment of the 1846 Oregon
Boundary Treaty). Lambert, I. analogized to the
United State v. Washington 50%-50% allocation of the
salmon fishery and the reserved water rights doc-
trine to reach his conclusion:
Aboriginal customs, traditions and practices
have given rise to an aboriginal right, to be
exercised in accordance with their rights of
self-regulation including recognition of the
need for conservation, to catch and, if they
wish. sell, themselves and through other
members of the Sto:lo people, sufficient
salmon to provide all the people who wish
to personally engaged in the fishery, and
their dependent families, when coupled
with other financial resources, with a mod-
erate livelihood, and. in any event, not less
than the quantity of salmon needed to pro-
vide every one of the collective holders of
the aboriginal right with the same amount
of salmon per person peryearas would have
been consumed or otherwise utilized by
each of the collective holders of the right, on
average, from a comparable years salmon
run, in, say. 1800.178
This case has been appealed to the Supreme Court,
and a decision should be rendered in 1996.
5. Negotiated Settlements
The obvious alternative to putting matters in
judicial hands is to reach an acceptable agreement
which accounts for the interests of First Nations,
and those of the provincial and federal govern-
ments. Three types of agreements were discussed
earlier in Part I.B. The section of the Champagne
and Aishihik First Nation Final Agreement relevant
to salmon and developments in British Columbia
are presented here. The specific provisions on
salmon in the Champagne and Aishihik Final
Agreement state that:
for the drainage basin of the Alsek River.
Government shall allocate the first 3.000
sockeye Salmon and the first 200 chinook
Salmon to the Champagne and Aishihik. if
the total allowable catch is established for
either sockeye or chinook for the drainage
basin of the Alsek River. Government and the
174. Delgamuukw,. 104 D.L.R. (4th) at 470 (reasons for
Judgement of Mr. justice Lambert at 603-747) (the highest court
has granted review and oral arguments are sheduled for July.
1996).
175. R. v. Van der Peet (1993). 83 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (B.C.C.A.).
119931 CN.L.R. 221. 119931 5 W.W.R. 459. 80 B.C.LR. (2d) 75. 20
W.C.B. (2d) 305 (Lambert. J,. dissenting) Ileave to appeal to S.CC
granted (1994). 86 CC.C (3d) ii. 170 N.R. 382n).
176. Id. at 92 (reasons for Judgment of Mr. Justice
MacFarlane)
177. Id. at 125 (reasons for Judgment of Mr. lustice Lambert).
178. Id. at 128.
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First Nations shall use best efforts to negoti-
ate a percentage allocation, and for other
species of Salmon in the drainage basin,
Government shall ensure that the needs of
Champagne and Aishihik People for Salmon
for food receive primary consideration in the
allocation of those species of salmon.'
79
With regard to the allocation of commercial and
sport fishing licenses, the Final Agreement states:
(I) Government shall allocate to the
Champagne and Aishihik either the first
two commercial salmon fishing licenses or
26% of the total number of any commercial
salmon fishing licenses which may be
issued, whichever is greater.
(2) Government shall allocate to the
Champagne and Aishihik, either the first
two commercial salmon sport licenses or
26% of the total number of any commercial
salmon sport fishing licenses which maybe
issued by the government, whichever is
greater.i80
Because the other thirteen First Nations in the
Yukon will use the same Umbrella Agreement, it is
reasonable to assume specific numbers of fish and
licenses will be identified for each First Nation. An
advantage of these agreements over court decisions
is that they include detailed provisions to which
each party is amenable.
In British Columbia, First Nations are taking a
strong stance on several fronts. Forthcoming agree-
ments (assuming they can be finalized) may have
terms that look like the Gwai Haanas interim agree-
ment in which sustaining the Haida culture is a
prime objective. Prior to the Agreement the Haida
Nation unilaterally imposed a $10 (later raised to
$25) per person management fee on sport fishing
boats that entered traditional Haida waters. 181 The
acquiescence of seventy percent of the sport fishing
boats and the acquiescence of the government, sug-
gests that self-government is acceptable in some
situations. With practically the entire province sub-
ject to aboriginal claims by at least fifteen First
Nations negotiating groups, the Treaty Commission
process is likely to take many years and perhaps
179. Champagne and Aishihik First Nations Final
Agreement. May, 1993, para. 16.10.6.1 - 16.10.6.5.
180. Id. para. 16.10.18.1 - 16.10.18.6.
181. Miles Richardson, supra note 87.
182. United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312
(W.D. Wash. 1974), afrd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976); see supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
decades to complete. Funding for settlement is also
a major uncertainty, and governmental financial
shortcomings loom as a deal breaker. At this time
any conclusions about First Nations in British
Columbia must be labeled "tentative."
III. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The following section summarizes and con-
trasts First Nations fishing rights in each country,
analyzes substantive differences, and forecasts fur-
ther developments for the coming years.
A. The United States
Treaties were important to the settlement of
Oregon and Washington, and they explicitly pre-
served Native American fishing rights. Federal
courts have repeatedly relied upon treaty language
to enforce fishing rights in the Columbia River and
Puget Sound regions. 82 The canons of treaty inter-
pretation which emphasize Native understandings
of treaties also help to protect fishing rights. In
California the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo did not
explicitly protect fishing rights, and consequently,
courts have been more deferential to governmental
regulation in California than in Washington and
Oregon.183 And although varying levels of protection
for activities that were equally essential seems
anomalous, consistency and the preservation of
Native cultures were not primary governmental
objectives in the nineteenth century. The primary
goal of treaty negotiations in the western United
States was to extinguish Indian title by the most
practical means. Largely due to timing rather than
conscious choice, the mechanisms employed in the
Oregon Territory ended up more protective than
those used to clear title in California.
In Alaska, aboriginal interests were largely
ignored prior to passage of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971. Settlement
pressure in Alaska was not as intense as in the
lower 48 states, yet resource conflicts over the
salmon fishery occurred before 1915.184 As in other
Pacific coast states, treaty derived fishing rights
have been protected more vigorously than non-
treaty rights.185 ANCSA explicitly extinguished abo-
riginal title and provided significant monetary ben-
efits. However, subsistence rights and Native
183. Unted States v. Wilson. 611 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Cal.
1985). revd, United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir,
1986); see supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
184. Alaska Pac Fisheries Co. v United States, 248 U.S, 78 (1918)
185. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S, 60, afg,
Metlakatla Indian Community Annette Islands Reserve v. Egan,
369 U.S. 45 (1962); see supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text,
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involvement in the management of fish and wildlife
resources remain contentious. Three distinctly dif-
ferent patterns of territorial acquisition occurred
along the Pacific coast of the United States, and not
surprisingly, three different patterns of protection,
or lack thereof, emerged. That similarly situated
Native groups were not treated uniformly affirms
the proposition asserted earlier that legal decisions
and governmental policies in the United States do
not yield a cohesive doctrine of law.
A common concern to all the Pacific coast
states is the comprehensive management necessary
to maintain healthy and productive fisheries. The
inclusion of Native representatives on the
Commission responsible for administering the
Pacific Salmon Treaty provides Native management
with leverage it had previously lacked. Similarly, the
multi-pronged mandate of the Northwest Power
Planning Council and the influence of the Columbia
River Inter Tribal Fishing Commission have helped
to further the interests of tribes along the Columbia
River Basin, where federal hydroelectric operations
have decimated salmon runs. Offshore manage-
ment by the Pacific Fishery Management Council
also plays a vital role by controlling commercial
ocean catches. Unfortunately, the consternation
and confusion resulting from reduced catch levels
and dwindling fishery populations may exacerbate
divisions between Native Americans and non-native
fishing interests. Protecting imperiled fish popula-
tions, enhancing habitat and prioritizing fishing by
Native Americans will remain controversial for years
to come.
B. Canada
North of the 49th parallel, salmon fishing rights
evolved differently. As was the case in Alaska, abo-
riginal claims to much of British Columbia and the
Yukon Territory were ignored. The seminal case of
St. Cathenne's Milling & Lumber described indigenous
interests as being at the "pleasure of the Crown"
and as "mere burdens on title."8 6 Generally, before
1982, court decisions dealing with aboriginal rights
did little to affirm or strengthen fishing rights. The
recognition of First Nations rights in the
Constitution Act of 1982 significantly changed legal
relations. Aboriginal rights unextinguished prior to
1982 now have constitutional status. Any infringe-
ment of an aboriginal right must be justified under
the Sparrow analysis, under which aboriginal fishing
rights receive priority over other uses. In 1985,
Guenn identified a federal fiduciary obligation
toward First Nations for the first time,187 analogous
to the federal trust responsibility of the United
States government recognized 150 years earlier in
Chierokee Nation and Worcester.
In British Columbia the treaty process is not in
an advanced stage, and predictions about the form
and content of final agreements are not easy to
make. In treaty areas with salmon, i.e., the southern
end of Vancouver Island. the legal analysis
employed is similar to that used in the United
States. The canons of construction enumerated in
Saanichton Bay Marina require a "large and liberal
construction," and that treaties be construed as
"they would naturally be understood by Indians."' 8s
The concept of incidental rights, or ancillary or
appurtenant rights necessary to support explicit
treaty rights, has been expressly approved by the
Supreme Court of Canada. 18 9 For the Tsawout Band
(Saanichton Bay), this was interpreted to mean that
fishing rights were dependent on the biological
well- being of the fishery and fishing grounds. This
is similar to the reserved rights doctrine and habitat
protection rights recognized in United States cases.
In the absence of a treaty. First Nations rarely
were able to enforce fishing rights prior to 1982. but
since the enactment of the Constitution Act of 1982
a trend toward stronger aboriginal rights is evident
in court decisions and the provisions of settlement
agreements. Aboriginal claims in the Yukon are
being settled through an Umbrella Agreement fol-
lowed by specific First Nations Final Agreements.
As in the United States, non-treaty First Nations are
in a weaker position than treaty First Nations, but in
Canada stronger rights can be secured through set-
tlement agreements where aboriginal claims still
exist. The agreements signed in the Yukon Territory
contain modem treaty fishing rights, and the evolv-
ing B.C. Treaty Commission process will also even-
tually lead to modem treaties. These pending
treaties will be more explicit regarding self-regula-
tion, commercial fishing, and habitat protection
than treaties concluded in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies, reducing the need for incidental or reserved
rights.
Where fishing rights represent economic or
political power they can be used effectively to fur-
ther larger sovereignty concerns. From a judicial
perspective, self- regulation rights are extremely dif-
ficult to deal with because if affirmed they may limit
federal powers of authority. In Sparrow. the Canadian
Supreme Court did not apply the infringement and
justification analysis to the asserted right of self
186. See supra text accompanying note 61.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
188. Sa supra text accompanying note 136.
189. S e supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
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regulation. One position is that the judiciary relies
upon an Anglo-Canadian understanding to the
detriment of alternate understandings. "lflurispru-
dential traits have the effect of maintaining and per-
petuating a hierarchical relationship between
native peoples and the Canadian state "190 The
failure to obtain further constitutional reform for
self government rights at the 1992 Charlottetown
Accord emphasizes the difficulty of this subject.
C. Substantive Differences
One drastic difference north and south of the
49th parallel is commercial fishing. In British
Columbia, aboriginal commercial fishing rights
have not been recognized historically, and they were
found to be only incidental to the Sto:lo culture,
and thus not constitutionally protected under sec-
tion 35(l).191 But on the south side of the 49th par-
allel, Native Americans are permitted to catch up to
fifty percent of the harvest, or that which affords
them a moderate livelihood 9 2 The different treat-
ment cannot be explained by the differences in
Native cultures. Coastal Salish people are located
on both sides of the international border, and
salmon serve a central subsistence, religious and
ceremonial purpose in many Native cultures. The
differences are more appropriately attributed to
inconsistent governmental policies, the arbitrary
location of jurisdictional boundaries and judicial
decisions that resisted the integration of Native
customs and practices. The Champagne and
Aishihik Final Agreement in the Yukon territory
explicitly states that First Nations are to receive a
minimum number or percentage of commercial
fishing licenses, and it is reasonable to assume that
the forthcoming British Columbia agreements will
also deal explicitly with commercial fishing.
In the United States, self-regulation rights were
conditionally affirmed in United States v.
Washington,193 and therefore the topic is not as con-
tentious as it is in Canada. Native American repre-
sentation on the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Commission, without Native participation from the
Canadian side, illustrates one difference between
Canada and the United States. The one exception
involving salmon fishing seems to be subsistence
rights in Alaska, where one decision stated that
Congress did not intend for Native Alaskans to be
treated similarly to Indians in the lower forty-eight
states. 94 As treaties are negotiated in British
190. Macklem, supra note 48, at 443.
191. R. v. Van der Peet (1993). 83 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (B.C.C.A.).
119931 C.N.L.R. 221, 119931 5 W.W.R. 459, 80 B.C.L.R. (2d) 75. 20
W.C.B. (2d) 305 (Lambert, I., dissenting) Ileave to appeal to S.C.C.
granted (1994), 86 C.C.C. (3d) vii. 170 N.R. 382n]; see supra text
accompanying note 164.
Columbia, international differences may diminish,
but with a potentially odd consequence. Conflicts
between Native Alaskans, First Nations in Canada
and Native Americans in the lower forty-eight states
are conceivable as more becomes known about the
movement and interception of specific species.
Increased Native ocean trolling and commercial
fishing could conceivably escalate inter-tribal ten-
sions.
Lastly, protection of First Nations' rights in the
Canadian Constitution represents a significant dif-
ference from the United States. Prior to 1982, a col-
orable argument could be made that Canada lagged
behind the United States in terms of respecting and
enforcing Native rights through its adherence to
language of St. Cathenne's Milling & Lumber Co., and
by refusing to negotiate aboriginal claims with non-
treaty First Nations. After 1982, the opposite argu-
ment can be proffered. However, definitive evidence
is lacking. The Canadian Supreme Court is not yet
willing to recognize self-government as an aborigi-
nal right, but the Sparrow decision represents a sig-
nificant, although cautious, move away from deci-
sions of the past in which the ultimate sovereignty
of the Crown was never questioned. In the United
States, constitutional reform seems unlikely even
though bitter debates continue over fishing rights,
taxation, gambling and land use regulation of
Indian Country.
D. Looking Ahead
Future legal action concerning First Nations
fishing rights will be needed to clear up several
uncertainties: uncertainty about the health of fish-
eries, uncertainty-about the extent of self regula-
tion, and uncertainty about what can be gained
from more court cases. Pending settlement agree-
ments (treaties) in the Yukon Territory and British
Columbia may clear up some of the uncertainty by
explicitly addressing controversial areas. These
agreements will also close the legal gap between
treaty and non-treaty First Nations. As noted earli-
er, the limited number of treaties in British
Columbia was the result of the financial shortcom-
ings of the Crown, and cannot be attributed to sta-
tus differences among First Nations. On Vancouver
Island, it is illogical for the southern bands (i.e.,
Tsawout) to have expansive treaty rights while deny-
ing the Nu-chah-nulth people, their neighbors to
the north in Clayoquot Sound, the same level of
192. See Washington v Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979),
193. See supra text accompanying note 99.
194. Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management &
Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 41 (Alaska 1988); see supra note 44,
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rights. Additional treaties will probably lead to
commercial fishing and an increase in the allowable
catch of First Nations.
Management of fisheries requires measures to
protect the flowrate, water quality, temperature, and
spawning habitat of a particular watercourse and to
ensure that sufficient numbers of fish successfully
avoid obstacles (i.e., fishing nets and dams) to
reach their spawning grounds. In the United States,
Winters rights, Clean Water Act authority, habitat
protection rights (United States v. Washington) and
reserved fishing rights (Wilson) can be invoked to
secure improved habitat protection and fishery
management. In Canadian treaty areas, incidental
rights (Simon, Saanichton Bay Manna) can be invoked
for the same purposes. And although reserved
rights are not as universally accepted in Canada, the
Pasco and Burrard Power cases in British Columbia
support broad resource rights for reserve land. In
non-treaty areas, forthcoming settlement agree-
ments (treaties) can be used for the same purpose
if they include explicit management rights.
Two international matters require a cooperative
approach and are beyond the jurisdiction of either
country alone: the Pacific Salmon Treaty and man-
agement of the upper Columbia River Basin.
Canadian representation on the PST Commission is
limited to the federal government, while Native
Americans are represented directly on the
Commission. This means that Canadian loyalties
must be split between maintaining diplomatic
international relations and representing First
Nations' positions. Responsibly representing First
Nations that depend on salmon from transbound-
ary rivers, where particular runs of salmon must cir-
cumvent ocean nets and Alaskan fisherman on the
American side of the border before ascending to
British Columbia and the Yukon, is a difficult task.
Direct Native representation from both sides of the
border may put the First Nations of Canada on a
more equal footing.
The other international area of concern sur-
rounds the construction of dams on the Columbia
River, especially the Grand Coulee Dam in
Washington. Construction and operation of Grand
Coulee is controversial on the United States side of
the border, but when viewed from the perspective of
First Nations in Canada it is difficult to characterize
it as anything other than a dismal mistake. The dam
completely annihilated anadramous fish runs in
southeastern British Columbia and caused serious
hardship for First Nations there. The United States
could not have received consent from Canada to
decimate the upper basin salmon runs because
aboriginal claims were never surrendered in this
part of British Columbia. A host of interesting legal
and jurisdictional questions are raised by this situ-
ation: can the Ktunaxa/Kinbasket. Okanagan and
Shuswap Nations bring damage claims in either the
federal courts of Canada or the United States? is
sovereign immunity a valid defense? and what kind
of remedy is avdilable? But due to the cooperative
approach adopted by the parties, these questions
probably will not be answered definitively, and an
international agreement is a more likely outcome.
The Canadian Columbia Inter-Tribal Fishing
Commission (CCITFC) has been formed to address
.the impacts on anadramous fish runs due to the
construction of dams on both sides of the border
The CCITFC Mission Statement reads:
The stewardship of the land and resources
of the Canadian Columbia River basin
flows to First Nations from the Creator. The
ICCITFC] will ensure that the aboriginal
right of First Nations to fisheries resources
is protected. Under the authority of the
First Nations of the Canadian Columbia
River basin, the CCRIFC will facilitate and
coordinate protection, conservation, man-
agement, harvesting and enhancement of
native fish stocks and their habitat includ-
ing water quality. The CCRIFC will facilitate
compensation, mitigation, and reparation
to these First Nations for fishery resource
losses. 95
The Mission Statement speaks for itself. The issue
of international aboriginal rights has received little
attention. However, the involvement of U.S. parties
(Bonneville Power Administration. Northwest
Power Planning Council, and the U.S. CRITFC)
195. Status Report. Fiscal Year 92/93. Canadian Columbia
River Co-Operative Fisheries Management Project. January 1993.
The CCRIFC is composed of representatives from the
Ktunaxa/Kinbasket. Okanagan and Shuswap Nation Tribal
Councils. For comparison purposes, the preamble to the
Constitution and Bylaws of the United States Columbia River
Inter-Tribal Fishing Council (1977) reads:
We. the Indians of the CRITFC. recognize that our fish-
enes are a basic and important natural resource and of
vital concern to the Indians of these states and that the
conservation of this resource is dependent upon effec-
tive and progressive management. And that It is further
recognized that federal court decisions have specifically
established that the Tribes have treaty rights to an equi-
table share of the Columbia Basin fishery resource. We
further believ;e that by unity of action we can best
accomplish these things, not only for the benefit of our
own people but for all of the people of the Pacific
Northwest.
U. S.Co us.h.4'"n.lm-Tr.. F'- G ctrc Co:is. (1977) pmbL
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implies that such rights are not regarded lightly.
Native American tribes may have waived claims for
fishery habitat destruction against the federal gov-
ernment in exchange for representation in United
States v. Washington (Phase 1I),'9 but no such deal
exists on the Canadian side of the border.
Conclusion
In one sentence Chief Justice Dickson summa-
rized the theme of this Article: "it is impossible to
give an easy definition of fishing rights." He pointed
to the source of many misunderstandings by noting
that it is "crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal
perspective." 9 7 The early history of United States
and Canada with respect to indigenous communi-
ties can be described as noble ambitions followed
by governmental actions that often fell short. A
patchwork of case law and governmental policies
characterizes fishing rights in both countries. The
high points are exemplified by (1) the treaties of
Oregon, Washington and Vancouver Island--which
provide substantial protection of fishery rights--and
by (2) the constitutional level First Nations rights
receive in Canada. The low points are illustrated by
decisions ignoring aboriginal rights in Alaska,
British Columbia and the Yukon for so long, and by
the construction of mainstem dams on the
Columbia River.
Unfortunately, the confusion and anger associ-
ated with First Nations fishing may continue as the
substance and extent of rights are litigated. More
negotiated agreements may be one answer, but in
British Columbia the drawn-out treaty process is
already straining relations 98 Fishing rights cannot
be isolated from the customs, beliefs and practices
from which they originate. Answering to govern-
mental agencies and processes that are not repre-
sentative of Native communities perpetuates tense
relationships borne in an era of governmental sup-
pression. The ludicial and legislative trend toward
increased protection of aboriginal rights and
restoration of natural habitat conditions may even-
tually lead to improved fishing rights, enabling
Native people to share more fully in their cultural
heritage.
196. COHEN. supra note 28, at 139. ment anthe WEEKEND SUN to openly criticize Premier Harcourt
197. R. v. Sparrow (1990). 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 411 (S.C.C.). about the slow pace of negotiations and the apparent prioritiza-
tion of First Nations using blockades or lawsuits to attract atten-
198. The Sechelt Indian Band took out a full page advertize- tion. See supra note 87.
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